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 Abstract 
 It has been claimed – though not proved – that victims will be benefi ted by participation in inter-
national criminal tribunals. Th is article interrogates this claim in the context of victim participation 
at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), commonly referred to as the 
Khmer Rouge Tribunal. Based on interviews with Cambodian victims and Tribunal affi  liates, it 
examines why and how the Tribunal permits victims to intervene as  les parties civile , pulling together 
the normative and legal basis for this mode of victim participation. Th is article does not purport to 
generalize with confi dence about Cambodian victims in general, let alone all victims of mass atroc-
ity. Instead, it simply seeks to move beyond vague speculations that victim participation in interna-
tional trials is always therapeutic, and suggest a new indigenized victimology that the Tribunal 
should explore as the long-awaited trials of the Khmer Rouge unfold. 
 Keywords 
 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) ;  Khmer Rouge Tribunal ;  Cambodia 
 “My Guru says I am like a lotus fl ower that fl oats on water. People may try to drag me down 
by my roots but, like the lotus, I will rise to the surface, stronger and better than before.” 
 Chin Navy (Cambodian Survivor of the Khmer Rouge, 4 December 2008) 
 1. Introduction 
 Affi  liates, jurists and scholars of international justice tend to have vaunted ambi-
tions. Th ey argue that international(ized) 1 courts deter future crime, 2 establish an 
 1)  I use the phrase international(ized) to refer to both purely international  ad hoc courts such as the 
international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and Rwanda (“ICTR”), and 
the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) as well as hybrid tribunals, such as the Special Panels of 
the Dili District Court (“SPDC”), the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”), the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”). 
 2)  See, e.g.,  Richard A. Posner , Retribution and Related Concepts of Punishment, 9 Journal of Legal 
Studies. 71, 72-78 (1980);  Michael P. Scharf , Th e Case for a Permanent International Truth 
Commission, 7 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law. 375, 398 (1997). 
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offi  cial historiographic record, 3 foster the rule of law, 4 promote reconciliation 
within post-confl ict societies, 5 and achieve restorative justice by helping victims 
regain their autonomy and dignity. 6 Each of these arguments is largely unproven 
by empirical research, 7 raising the question of whether advocates risk undermin-
ing the credibility of prosecution processes by overstating their likely consequenc-
es. 8 Th is article examines the fi nal argument in the context of Cambodian victims 
of the Khmer Rouge. 9 
 3)  See, e.g.,  Sanja Kutnjak Ivković , Justice by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, 37 Stanford Journal of International Law 255, 265 (2001) (quoting the ICTY’s 
President as stating that many people in the former Yugoslavia consider the tribunal most valuable 
to “remind people what happened here”);  Diane F. Orentlicher , Settling Accounts: Th e Duty to 
Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 Yale Law Journal 2537, 2546 n.32 
(1991) (quoting Justice Robert Jackson, chief U.S. prosecutor for the Nuremburg trials of Nazi war 
criminals, on the purpose of those proceedings). 
 4)  See, e.g.,  Naomi Roht-Arriaza , Introduction to Impunity and Human Rights in International 
Law and Practice 3, 4 ( Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995); see generally  Johan D. van der Vyver , Book 
Review, 18 Emory International Law Review 133, (2004) (reviewing  Bruce Broomhall , International 
Justice and the International Criminal Court: Between Sovereignty and the Rule of Law (2003)). 
 5)  See, e.g . ,  Harvey M. Weinstein &  Eric Stover , Introduction: Confl ict, Justice and Reclamation, in 
My Neighbour, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity 1, 3–4 ( Eric 
Stover &  Harvey M. Weinstein (eds.), 2004) (quoting former ICTY President Antonio Cassese); 
 Laurel E. Fletcher &  Harvey M. Weinstein , Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the Contribution 
of Justice to Reconciliation, 24 Human Rights Quarterly 573, 597–601 (2002). 
 6)  See, e.g.,  Juan Méndez , Comments on Prosecution: Who and For What?, in Dealing with the 
Past: Truth & Reconciliation in South Africa 87, 90 ( Alex Boraine et al . (eds.), 1994)(arguing that 
“prosecution in itself will provide a measure of healing and show the victims that their plight has 
not been forgotten by the states and society”);  Ivković , Justice by the ICTY, op.cit , at 334 (the ICTY 
aims to provide “justice to the victims and thereby advanc[e] the processes of healing and reconcili-
ation”);  Debra Kaminer et al ., Th e Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa: Relation 
to Psychiatric Status and Forgiveness Among Survivors of Human Rights Abuses, 178 British 
Journal of Psychiatry 373, 375 (2001) (speculating that “[i]f justice is done, and seen to be done, 
psychological healing may be facilitated”);  Neil J. Kritz , Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review 
of Accountability Mechanisms for Mass Violations of Human Rights, 59 Law and Contemporary 
Problems. 127, 129 (1996) (“[T]otal impunity, in the form of comprehensive amnesties or the 
absence of any accountability for past atrocities, is immoral,  injurious to victims , and in violation of 
international legal norms.” (emphasis added)). 
 7)   Laurel E. Fletcher &  Harvey M. Weinstein , Violence and Social Repair, op.cit , at 585 (““[the] 
primary weakness of writings on transitional justice is the paucity of empirical evidence to substan-
tiate claims about how well criminal trials achieve the goals ascribed to them.”) 
 8)  See e.g . Jose E. Alvarez , Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 Yale Journal 
of International Law. 365, 459 (1999) (calling for tribunal sponsors and affi  liates to articulate their 
goals more clearly and to be wary of over-stating their potency);  Nehal Bhuta , How Shall We Punish 
the Perpetrators? Human Rights, Alien Wrongs and the March of International Criminal Law, 27 
Melbourne University Law Review 255, 2555 (2003) (“Among victims and their families from 
Rwanda to East Timor, disillusionment with internationalised justice processes — in the wake of 
unrealistically high expectations — is not diffi  cult to fi nd.”); For Rwanda, see generally  Samantha 
Power , Rwanda: Th e Two Faces of Justice’, Th e New York Review of Books (New York), 47 (2003). 
For East Timor, see generally  Nehal Bhuta , East Timor and the Vicissitudes of Externalised Justice” 
165 (2001) Finnish Yearbook of International Law. 
 9)  On April 17, 1975, the Khmer Rouge troops seized control of Cambodia’s capital, Phnom Penh, 
marking the beginning of 3 years, 8 months and 20 days of an attempt to transform Cambodian 
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 Today, thirty years after the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge, Kaing Guek Eav, 
66, better known by his  nom de guerre , Duch, stands trial before the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC or the Tribunal”), a hybrid crimi-
nal tribunal co-installed by the United Nations (“UN”) and the Cambodian gov-
ernment. 10 Duch is the fi rst defendant to be tried by the ECCC. Duch was the 
commandant of S-21 (“Tuol Sleng”) prison and detention center, which allegedly 
sent at least 15,000 people to their deaths in unmarked graves. Four other senior 
Khmer Rouge leaders who were in a position to order the commission of mass 
atrocity are also in custody. Th ey are Nuon Chea, 82, the movement’s chief ideo-
logue; Khieu Samphan, 76, who was head of state; Ieng Sary, 82, the former 
foreign minister; and his wife, Ieng Th irith, 75, a fellow member of the Khmer 
Rouge Central Committee. Th eir joint trial is expected to commence later this 
year. 11 
 ECCC affi  liates claim that one of the major innovations of the ECCC is the 
enhanced recognition of victims in its proceedings. 12 Anyone who has suff ered 
from physical, psychological, or material harm as a direct consequence of the 
crimes committed in Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge regime between 17 April 
society into an agrarian utopia. Pol Pot and his senior leaders established a society based on agricul-
ture and total collectivism. Th e  Angkar or ‘Organization’, as the revolutionary movement named 
itself, was the sole governing power and the owner of all means of production and private property. 
Cambodia was renamed Democratic Kampuchea (DK). Th ere was, however, nothing democratic 
about the regime or its methods. From 1975 to 1979, it is estimates that at least 1.7 million people 
were executed or died of overwork, starvation, torture or untreated disease because of the Khmer 
Rouge. See generally  David P. Chandler , Th e Tragedy of Cambodian History (New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 1991). 
 10)  Th e ECCC, commonly known as the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, is a hybrid tribunal established on 
6 June 2003 by a bilateral agreement between the UN and the Cambodian government as an 
“Extraordinary Chambers within the existing court structure of Cambodia for the prosecution of 
crimes committed during the period of Democratic Kampuchea;”, albeit “with international assis-
tance”: Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia 
Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of 
Democratic Kampuchea, U.N.-Cambodia, 6 June 2003, available at <  http://www.cambodia.gov
.kh/krt/english/ index.htm > [hereinafter “the UN Agreement”]. Th e ECCC was recognized by the 
Cambodian legislature on 27 October 2004 when it ratifi ed and implemented the UN Agreement 
through the adoption of enabling legislation named the Law on the Ratifi cation of the Agreement 
between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution 
under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea and 
Law on Amendments to the Law on the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for 
the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, U.N.-
Cambodia, 5 October 2004, available at < http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/english/index.htm > 
[hereinafter “the ECCC Statute”]. 
 11)  For further information on the charges against the accused persons and the trials, see the ECCC’s 
web site < http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/ >. 
 12)  ECCC Website, available at <  http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/victims_unit.aspx > (“One of the 
major innovations of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) is the 
enhanced recognition of victims in its proceedings. Victims of crimes that fall under the jurisdiction 
of the Court are given a fundamental role in the ECCC.”) 
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1975 and 6 January 1979 is considered a “victim” by the ECCC. 13  Victims can 
submit complaints to the Co-Prosecutors, who take the interests of victims into 
account when considering whether to initiate an investigation or a prosecution. 
Victims may also participate as ‘civil parties’. Civil parties are participants in the 
proceedings, and therefore ostensibly enjoy the same rights as the Prosecution 
and the Defense. 14 Importantly, civil parties can claim collective and moral repa-
rations. 15 Commentators have applauded the new role for victims at the ECCC, 
saying that it is long overdue “recognition, after fi fteen years of international and 
hybrid courts like [the ECCC], not to exclude victims from the justice that is 
being dispensed on their behalf.” 16 
 Th e ECCC’s civil party process derives from a victim-centered approach to 
punishment, which suggests that a victim needs to tell her story before a decision-
maker within the framework of a formalized process in order to feel better. 17 Sug-
gestions abound about the soothing eff ects of participation. To  Naomi Roht-Arriaza , 
victims gain “a sense of control, an ability to lessen their isolation and be reinte-
grated into their community, and the possibility of fi nding meaning through 
participation in the process.” 18 For  Jamie O’Connell , participation may also restore 
 13)  Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Internal Rules (Rev. 3) (6 March 2007) 
[hereinafter “ECCC Internal Rules”, R.23 (2)(a)]. Since the ECCC Internal Rules were fi rst issued 
on 12 June 2007, they have been amended on 1 February 2008, 5 September 2008, and 6 March 
2009. Unless otherwise specifi ed, the phrase ‘ECCC Internal Rules’ refers to the latest version 
(Rev.3) of the Rules dated 6 March 2009. All four versions of the ECCC Internal Rules - i.e. the 
original version and the 3 subsequent amended versions - are available at < http://www.eccc.gov.kh/
english/ >. 
 14)  Several sources suggest that civil parties have a fundamental role at the ECCC as separate players 
in their own right. ECCC Internal Rules, R.23(6), (7), (8) and (9); Decision on Civil Party 
Participation in Provisional Detention Appeals (20 March 2008) 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ 
(PTC01) (Pre-Trial Chamber, ECCC), para 36, 38; Gabriela González Rivas, deputy head of the 
ECCC’s victims unit, interview with Seth Mydans in Khmer Rouge Tribunal, Victims will not 
stand idly by, New York Times , 17 June 2008 (“For the fi rst time in history, the internal rules of a 
international tribunal will give victims of crimes the possibility to participate as parties”);  HE Sean 
Visoth speaking at the Reparations Conference, 26 November 2008, on fi le with author (“No other 
hybrid court has given victims equivalent rights as the prosecution and defence than those set out 
in Cambodia’s ECCC …”); Annex A is the ECCC’s Practice Direction on Victim Participation 
(“Practice Direction”), which sets out the rights and responsibilities of victims under the ECCC’s 
Internal Rules and explains how potential victim participants can apply to be a part of the process. 
 15)  ECCC Internal Rules, R. 23(1)(b). 
 16)  Seth Mydans, In the Khmer Rouge Trials, Victims will not Stand Idle By, (June 17, 2008) 
(“Diane Orentlicher, Special Counsel of the Open Society Justice Initiative believes that the Tribunal 
marks the evolution of international criminal justice.”) 
 17)   Naomi Roht-Arriaza , ‘Impunity and Human Rights’, in  Naomi Roht-Arriaza ( ed.), International 
Law and International Law and Practice, 1995, p. 21 (“…more formalized procedures, including 
the ability to have an advocate and to confront and question their victimizers, may be more satisfy-
ing for victims than less formal, less adjudicative models.”) 
 18)  Ibid, 19; See also  Raquel Aldana-Pindell , An Emerging Universality of Justiciable Victims’ Rights 
in the Criminal Process to Curtail Impunity for State-Sponsored Crimes, 26 Human Rights 
Quarterly. 607, 675 (2004). 
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
0001102591.indd_PG2254   4   8/27/2009   3:30:26 PM
 M. Mohan / International Criminal Law Review 9 (2009) 1–43 5
a victim’s dignity by giving him “a sense of agency and capacity to act that the 
original abuse sapped.” 19 More than testifying as a witness, playing a role in the 
prosecution is said to “assist victims to take back control of their lives and to 
ensure that their voices are heard, respected, and understood.” 20 In short, partici-
pation is equated with ‘truth-telling’, which is held out as being fundamentally 
and necessarily benefi cial, validating the victims’ experience and permitting them 
to heal. 21 
 Th e notion that victims benefi t from participation is powerful and has rarely 
been disputed. 22 But is it correct? Th is article asks how the effi  cacy of the civil 
party process can be measured as a mode of participation, what civil participation 
means to (potential) Cambodian civil parties, and whether the process has deliv-
ered on its promises. Given that the pre-trial phase of the ECCC’s proceedings 
began in 2007 and that the fi rst trial is underway, I ask if Cambodian civil parties 
feel that they have enjoyed the benefi ts of participation. Based on my conversa-
tions with and observations of Cambodian victims and civil parties, I argue that 
the promises of victim-centrism are rhetorical devices that have little practical 
resonance for Cambodians. If anything, they soothe the ECCC’s affi  liates (and 
bolster their legitimacy), not victims, some of whom complain that their token 
participation has “revive(d) memories, bitterness and misery”, and a “loss of faith 
in the ECCC.” 23 
 Despite being a localized court, the ECCC has begun to externalize justice 
much like purely international tribunals. Th e ECCC’s promise that victims have 
a place in the proceedings results – as I shall explore below – in heightened disil-
lusionment for victims when the process turns out to be unreceptive to and 
incompatible with their subjective impressions, general reminiscences, emotions 
 19)   Jamie O’Connell , Gambling with the Psyche: Does Prosecuting Human Rights Violators Console 
Th eir Victims?, 46 Harvard International Law Journal. 295, 337 (2005), (quoting from a telephone 
interview with Mary Fabri, clinical psychologist). 
 20)   Yael Danieli , Victims: Essential Voices at the Court, Bull. (Victims Rts. Working Group, 
London, U.K.), Sept. 2004, at 6,  available at  www.vrwg.org . 
 21)   Judith Lewis Herman , Trauma and Recovery, p. 181 (New York: Basic Books, 1992) (“Th e fun-
damental premise of psychotherapeutic work [with survivors of severe trauma] is a belief in the 
restorative power of truth-telling.”) 
 22)  See  Emily Haslam , Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court: A Triumph of 
Hope Over Experience, in  Dominic McGoldrick et al . ((eds.)), Th e Permanent International 
Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues, p. 315 (2004) (observing the “widespread assumption that 
victims either do or can benefi t from participating in international criminal proceedings”). 
 23)  Press Release, Victims’ Press Conference at the ECCC, Victims Voice their Hopes and Concerns 
about ECCC (Dec. 3, 2009), on fi le with author. (“We hope participation in this process will pro-
vide us with some relief, a sense that justice has been done and an understanding of our history; but 
it also revives memories, bitterness, and misery. We began with hope that the ECCC would provide 
some satisfaction, but we are now concerned about the delays, the allegations of corruption, the 
suffi  ciency of available resources, and the lack of information on the progress made by the ECCC 
and prospects for our involvement. Th ese problems prompt many of us to lose hope and faith in the 
ECCC”). 
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and renditions of truth. 24 Contrary to the extant orthodoxy of victim-centrism, I 
found that the civil party process has begun to degrade victims even as it claims 
to soothe them. Far from giving victims a hearing or a genuine voice, it may leave 
them feeling silenced or frustrated. 
 Last December, I witnessed a striking illustration of this paradox that deserves 
to be set out at in this introductory section, as a foretaste of things to come. At a 
press conference held at the conclusion of a pre-trial hearing, Suth Ny, a petite 
51-year-old female civil party accosted Khieu Samphan’s Cambodian defense 
lawyer Sa Sovan, demanding that he explain how he could bring himself to defend 
a  genocidaire . Since the ECCC’s legal process provided her no avenue to express 
the full range of her feelings and emotions, Suthy Ny took it upon herself to 
chastise Sa Sovan, insisting that it was her right as a civil party to speak her 
mind. 25 As Suth Ny’s tone became increasingly strident, Sa Sovan rushed at the 
civil party. Security forces had to intervene to restrain them. 
 Two civil party applicants I spoke to, Ly Monysak and Sok Chear, were dis-
tressed by what happened. Sok Chear, 42, who said she was raped as a girl by the 
Khmer Rouge, remains inconsolable over the loss of her father, an engineer, who 
disappeared into the hands of a cadre and never returned. “We were always wait-
ing for him to come home, but he never came,” she told the press. 26 “We were 
always waiting and waiting. Even now, I still look around. Maybe my father is still 
alive.” Tears fl ow when she talks about him. “He gave me rice to eat, and I want 
to repay him,” she said, “even one plate of rice, my gift to him, even one plate for 
him to eat from his daughter.” 27 If Sok Chear had her way, she would fl ay the 
Khmer Rouge leaders - “slice him (a Khmer Rouge leader) into ribbons and pour 
salt into his wounds…and beat him up and torture him and give him electric 
 24)   Marie-Benedicte Dembour and  Emily Haslam , Silencing Hearings? Victim-Witnesses at War 
Crimes Trials, 15 European Journal of International, 151, 156 (2004). 
 25)  See  Douglas Gillision , Khieu Samphan Defense Team Blasts Translations, Th e Cambodia Daily, 
5 Dec., 2008. Th e press conference can be viewed at “Khieu Samphan’s Defense Team Faces off  
with Khmer Rouge Survivors < http://www.youtube.com/profi le?user=ElenaLesley&view=videos >. 
Th e contentious altercation between Suth Ny and Sa Sovan went as follows: 
Suth Ny: “You keep talking together and not letting us speak! We, victims, have come here to 
fi nd out the truth and inform the media of the suff erings we have been through during the 
Khmer Rouge regime, and to know how many people were killed! Hey, you, Khieu Samphan’s 
lawyer, don’t go away, I want to ask you a question!” 
  Sa Sovan [shrilly]: “Do not use this phrase [going away]! If Khieu Samphan has killed, I am 
not responsible for that!” 
  Suth Ny: “I did not say go away, I am asking you to stay! My parents died under the Khmer 
Rouge regime, and you, you are defending [Khieu Samphan]!!!”, the woman replied, more and 
more infuriated by the whole situation. 
  Sa Sovan (shouting, fi nger pointed towards Suth Ny reproachfully, and rushing towards 
Suth Ny): “My parents died too! 
 26)   Seth Mydans , Trial begins for Khmer Rouge Leader, International Herald Tribune, Feb. 16, 2009. 
 27)  Ibid. 
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shocks to make him talk.” 28 After she witnessed what happened to Suth, she said 
that she wished to “cut [Khieu Samphan and his lawyers] into tiny little pieces 
and eat them.” 29 
 For Ly Monysak, even that would be too little punishment for the alleged 
 genocidaires : “only killing (the Khmer Rouge leaders) will make me feel calm,” he 
said. “I want them to suff er the way I suff ered. I say this from the heart.” 30 Ly, 41, 
is an angry man, his voice quavering and eyes closed as he tells me of the loss of 
all 21 members of his family when he was just a boy of nine. Ly explained that he 
has come forward as a civil party to fi nd justice through verdict or punishment. 31 
Remarking that Sa Sovan’s act of lunging at Suth Ny had turned the court process 
“into a comedy”, Ly insisted that he would take matters into his own hands: “I 
want to kill all those people who did this to me,” he said. “And if I cannot, I’ll 
come back in the next life and fi nd them. Perhaps I will call on the Al’Quaeda or 
create my own genocidal regime and take my revenge on them all.” 32 
 Suth, Sok and Ly’s expressions are, in my opinion, simply a way for them to 
attempt to cope with what they have endured. It is the truth that they wished to 
tell, however chilling or jarring it may seem. Yet, it was not the truth that the 
ECCC’s affi  liates wished to hear or appreciate. Startled by their expressions, 
ECCC Prosecutors have described these victims as terrorists who posed a threat 
to the process, regardless of the fact that these victims had come forward to assist 
them. 33 I found that the ECCC’s legal process regards victims as having a collec-
tive story, a unitary, bounded and unchanging narrative of trauma that reduces 
and incorporates all that is essential into the ‘story of the victim.’ 34 Th e story of 
 28)  Ibid. 
 29)  Author’s interview with Sok Chear, Dec. 4, 2008. On fi le with author. 
 30)   Seth Mydans , In the Khmer Rouge Trials, Victims will not Stand Idle By, New York Times, 17 
June 2008. 
 31)  Author’s interview with Ly Monysak, 6 Dec. 2008 (“Th ere are three reasons why I have applied 
to join as a civil party. First, 21 members of my family were killed during the Pol Pot time. Th e 
second reason is that other people took my house in Phnom Penh. Th e third reason is that I lost my 
future… Th is would not have happened to be if there was no Khmer Rouge. My family was quite 
rich. I could have continued my studies in France in 1975 if Pol Pot had not come. I lost every-
thing. I can only be at rest, no longer angry and bitter about my past, if the court can sentence the 
wrongdoers. I will not fi nd peace until my family is avenged by the law and the Khmer Rouge are 
brought to justice. After I saw the lawyer (Sa) behaving so fi ercely towards sister Suth Ny, I thinks 
this court is a comedy”.) 
 32)  Author’s interview with Ly Monysak, Dec. 6 2008. 
 33)  Co-Prosecutor’s Response to Khieu Samphan’s Appeal Brief Against the Order Refusing request 
for Release Dated Oct. 28, 2008, Filed on Jan. 22, 2009. (“Th ree persons (Suth Ny, Sok Chear and 
Ly Monysak) reiterated those statements / threats against Khieu Samphan and his Defence team 
but also against the court at a press conference held after the PTC hearing on 4 December 2008…. 
Th erefore, the potential threat to the personal security of [the defendants], is not illusory, but vivid 
and concrete”.) 
 34)   Christopher J. Colvin , Traffi  cking Trauma – Intellectual Property Rights and the Political 
Economy of Traumatic Storytelling in South Africa in Telling Stories to Change the World, 
pp. 231, 227-237,  Rickie Solinger, Madeline Fox, Kayhan Irani ((eds.)), 2008) 
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the victim adheres to an unspoken norm that prefers narratives of helplessness to 
stories of responsibility, and tales of victimization to narratives of victimhood. 35 
ECCC affi  liates thus fi nd it diffi  cult to tolerate a victim who appears roguish, 
unreceptive to the court’s process, or simply convinced that  her story is unique 
and deserves special attention. 36 
 I fi nd that the ECCC’s civil party process, as it currently operates, does not 
always benefi t victims as it claims to. It has been said that international justice 
“will not only provide a forum for the particular defendant but also an arena in 
which the victims may be heard . ” 37 Yet, as we shall see, legal justice is often too 
‘thin’ to support therapeutic goals. Instead of seeking to provide for both retribu-
tive and restorative justice within the ECCC’s procedures or even a complemen-
tary legal mechanism, we should look to fora beyond the legal “arena” in order to 
deliver restorative justice to Cambodian victims. To do so even modestly, restor-
ative justice must be based on pre-existing values and communicated in a way 
that resonates amongst victims. I argue that victim-centrism’s therapeutic goals 
would be better served by a new victimology rooted in inherently local concep-
tions of story telling, art and ritual that avoid universalized narratives and deploy 
extra-legal ideas about mass atrocity in Cambodia. Given the attention that the 
ECCC has attracted, the hopes pinned on its performance, and the alternatives 
that could be foreclosed by exclusive reliance on law, it is critical for the ECCC 
to re-evaluate its goals. 
 Th is article begins in Section 2, by setting out the legal and normative frame-
work for victim participation at the ECCC. Section 3 sets out my qualitative, 
story-based research methodology. Section 4, the heart of this article, explores 
victims’ perceptions of the civil party process and demonstrates that the legal 
process can sometimes harm rather than help them. Th e article concludes in 
Section 5 by recommending that the ECCC should tone down and revisit its 
ambitions. Cambodian victims would be better served if local civil society and 
the international community focus their eff orts on and route reparations towards 
the non-legal approaches to victim-centrism. 
 2. Politics, Law and Norms of Victim Participation 
 Th e ECCC is, as  James Goldston astutely notes, an unusual experiment in 
transitional justice that stands at the juncture of two distinct, if overlapping, 
 35)   Martha Minow , Stories in Law in Telling Stories to Change the World, pp. 256, 250-263,  Rickie 
Solinger, Madeline Fox, Kayhan Irani  ((eds.)), 2008) 
 36)   Makau Mutua , Savages, Victims, and Saviors: Th e Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 Harvard 
International Law Journal. 201, 230 (2001). 
 37)   Leila N. Sadat , Universal Jurisdiction, op. cit., 196. 
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
0001102591.indd_PG2254   8   8/27/2009   3:30:26 PM
 M. Mohan / International Criminal Law Review 9 (2009) 1–43 9
politico-historical narratives. 38 At one level, the ECCC marks a milestone in 
Cambodia’s tortured experience of violence and suff ering—the fi rst serious eff ort 
to bring the law to bear, however incompletely, on the crimes wrought by the 
Khmer Rouge more than a quarter century ago. At the same time, the ECCC is 
the latest in a series of tribunals—starting with Nuremberg and culminating most 
recently with the ICC—intended to secure legal accountability for mass atrocities 
and, increasingly, to heal its victims, but not always succeeding in this regard. By 
permitting victims to participate in the ECCC’s proceedings, its affi  liates and 
proponents seem to hope that international(ized) justice can atone, or at least be 
seen as atoning for, past allegations that it has externalized justice. Victim partici-
pation at the ECCC has thus become, by moral if not legal obligation, a form of 
apologia. 39 
 2.1. Old Vestiges, New Courts: Judicial Activism at the ECCC 
 2.1.1. “Evidentiary Cannon-fodder”: Victims & the ICTY/R 
 Victim participation in criminal trials is not a novel concept. Many civil law 
countries permit victims to join proceedings as a third party, a “victim-prosecu-
tor”, “auxiliary prosecutor” or a “subsidiary prosecutor.” 40 Yet the ad hoc tribu-
nals, which have largely been based on the common law adversarial system, have 
not aff orded victims the same rights. 41 Th e ad hoc tribunals have not ventured 
outside the adversarial foundation of international criminal procedure that is 
 38)   James A. Goldston , An Extraordinary Experiment in Transitional Justice, in Justice Initiative 1, 
pp. 1-6(Open Society Justice Initiatve, 2006). 
 39)   Suzannah Linton , Reconciliation in Cambodia, Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2004, 62 
(“Th e views of [Cambodian] survivors and others directly aff ected must be taken into account, not 
simply on democratic principles  but from moral obligation, perhaps even as part of the State’s legal 
obligation to provide an eff ective remedy for gross violations of human rights. Th e public has been 
disempowered by the Cambodian government’s reluctance to involve it and share information of 
immense public interest”.) 
 40)  In these countries, the victim (or often the victim’s lawyer) can request investigatory measures, 
review the evidence against the defendant, deliver submissions, present evidence, cross-examine 
witnesses, and make closing arguments. See generally Criminal Procedure: A Worldwide Study 45 
( Craig Bradley ed., 1999); U.N. Offi  ce for Drug Control & Crime Prevention, Handbook on 
Justice for Victims 39 (1999) [hereafter U.N. Handbook]. 
 41)  Th e victims’ role in most common law jurisdictions is thus limited to that of witness. As a wit-
ness, the victim can only speak if called by the prosecution (or defense) and can only answer ques-
tions that are posed to her. Traditionally, common law criminal justice is, as Andrew Ashworth 
reminds us, “designed to punish crimes that impinge upon the public interest, and rob those crimes 
of their inter-personal character”, which includes their signifi cance to victims who have been 
wronged by these crimes in the fi rst place.  Andrew Ashworth , What Victims of Crime Deserve 
(Paper presented to the Fulbright Commission on Penal Th eory and Penal Practice, University of 
Stirling, September 1992) as cited by  M. Cavadino and  J. Dignan , Towards a Framework for 
Conceptualizing and Evaluating Models of Criminal Justice from a Victim’s Perspective, 4(3) 
International Review of Victimology 153 (1996). 
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 primarily conceived as conferring rights to defendants, not victims. 42  Patricia 
Wald has claimed that victim-witnesses are the “the soul of war crimes prosecu-
tion” at the ICTY and ICTR. 43 In reality, the victim-witness, whose complaint is 
instrumental in initiating the case, plays a limited role: she may only speak in 
court if called by the prosecution, and may only relay information to the judges 
within the questioning parameters laid down by counsel. 44 Other affi  liates, jurists 
and scholars posit that the tribunals’ proceedings have served as a forum for 
“catharsis”, “mourning”, “fundamental healing” and provided an opportunity for 
victims to have their stories “formally heard and acknowledged” in a public 
forum. 45 Yet, victim-witnesses have frequently been treated poorly: exposed 
to indiff erence, insult and the dangers associated with testifying in a hostile 
 42)   Mark Findlay , Internationalized Criminal Trial and Access to Justice, 2 International Criminal 
Law Review. 237, 253 (2002). International tribunals’ preference for retributive justice in the name 
of victims, as opposed to restorative justice for their benefi t, can be traced to the Nuremburg and 
the Tokyo international military tribunals. Neither tribunal provided protection, support, represen-
tation or participatory rights of any sort for victims. Victims were a peripheral concern as these 
trials were devoted to delivering retributive (victors’) justice through the “prompt trial and punish-
ment of the major war criminals of the European Axis and in Japan.” Rather than hear live testi-
mony, Prosecutors relied heavily on the paper trail left behind by the perpetrators of World War II 
crimes. It is telling that the Nuremburg tribunal’s founding statute does not even mention the 
phrase ‘victim’. See e.g.  S. Garkawe , Victims and the International Criminal Court: three major 
issues, 3 International Criminal Law Review. 345 (2003); see also  M. Bachrach , Th e Protection and 
Rights of Victims under International Criminal Law, 34 Th e International Lawyer. 7, 12 (2000); 
see also  H.A.M. von Hebel , An International Criminal Court-a historical perspective, in  H. A. M. 
von Hebel ,  et. al ., ((eds.)), Refl ections on the ICC, pp. 19, 21 (1999). 
 43)  See  Patricia M. Wald , To ‘Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence’: Th e Use of Affi  davit 
Testimony in Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings, 24 Harvard International Law Journal. 
535, 538 (2001). 
 44)   N’Dri &  Maurice Kauadio, Critical Analysis of Victims’ Rights Before International Criminal 
Justice 20 (Oct. 2006) (unpublished manuscript on fi le with Faculty of Law, Centre for Human 
Rights, University of Pretoria);  Claude Jorda &  Jérôme de Hemptinne , Th e Status and the Role of the 
Victim, in Th e Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary 1387 (Antonio 
Cassese ed., 2004) (stating that international criminal justice provided by the ad hoc tribunals is 
“deleterious”). 
 45)  See  Prosecutor v. Erdemovic , Case No. IT-9 6-22-T, para 65 (ICTY, Trial Chamber I Nov. 29, 
1996) (aiming to allow the “sorely affl  icted to mourn those among them who had been unjustly 
killed”); see also  Mark J. Osiel , Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of Administrative Massacre , 144 
U. PA. L. Rev. 463, 471-73, 478, 512 (1995) (describing prosecutions as providing “a cathartic 
theater” and “national group therapy”). Fourth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 , U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Agenda 
Item 49, 179, U.N. Docs. A/52/375, S/1997/729 (1997) , para. 192 (“[W]itnesses who have come 
to Th e Hague have commented afterwards that the opportunity to testify before a duly constituted 
court has brought them great relief. Justice’s cathartic eff ects may therefore promise hope for recov-
ery and reconciliation ….); see also, e.g.,  Minna Schrag , Th e Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal: An 
Interim Assessment , 7 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, Issue 19 (1997) (“For the 
international community to acknowledge, in a public forum, what happened to the victims is prob-
ably essential to fundamental healing.”). 
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 environment against powerful defendants. 46 Although the  ad hoc tribunals are 
celebrated as landmark achievements in the struggle against impunity for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law, to many victims, the tribunals’ pro-
cesses have been far from healing. 47 
 In 2000, lamenting the fact that victim-witnesses at the ICTY/R have often 
been reduced to” evidentiary cannon fodder” 48 , former Chief Prosecutor of both 
tribunals  Carla Del Ponte had this to say: “Th e voice of survivors and relatives of 
those killed are not suffi  ciently heard. Victims have almost no rights to partici-
pate in the [ICTR’s] trial process, despite the widespread acceptance nowadays 
that victims should be allowed to do so. And those remarks apply equally to the 
Yugoslav Tribunal, where the position of victims is no better… It is regrettable that 
the Tribunal’s statute makes no provision for victim participation during the trial …. 
I would therefore respectfully suggest to the Council that the present system falls short 
of delivering justice to the people of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and I would 
invite you to give serious and urgent consideration to any change that would remove 
this lacuna in our process ” [Emphasis added]. 49 
 2.1.2. “ Extraordinary”: Victims & the ECCC 
 Del Ponte’s call was not lost on the ECCC’s judges. Th e ECCC’s foundational 
documents do not expressly provide for civil party action. Th e UN Agreement 
is silent on the matter. 50 Th e ECCC Statute is ambiguous and inconclusive. 
Article 36 of the ECCC Statute states that victims may lodge appeals against trial 
 46)   Eric Stover has observed that ICTY judges “can – and often do – admonish witnesses who stray 
from the facts, which in turn can frustrate victims who have waited years to tell their story publicly.” 
See  Eric Stover , Th e Witnesses: War Crimes and the Promise of Justice in Th e Hague 106 (2005) 
which documents the fi ndings from the fi rst study of victim-witnesses who have testifi ed before the 
ICTY;  Mikaela Hekkila , International Criminal Tribunals and Victims of Crime: A Study of the 
Statues of Victims Before International Criminal Tribunals and the Factors Aff ecting Th is Status, 
pp. 57, 57-136 (2004). 
 47)   Jean-Marie Kamatali , From the ICTR to ICC: Learning from the ICTR Experience in Bringing 
Justice to Rwandans, 12 New England Journal of International & Comparative Law. 89, 96 (2005) 
(“Denying victims [participation and compensation] is not only a justice delayed, but also a justice 
denied.”); ibid ., at 99 (stating that bringing justice and reconciliation to Rwandans was only sec-
ondary to the ICTR’s main interest in deterring future crimes). 
 48)   Jonathon Doak , Victims’ Rights in Criminal Trials: Prospects for Participation 32 Journal of Law 
and Society 294, 299 (2005);  M. Cavadino and  J. Dignan , Towards a Framework for Conceptualizing 
and Evaluating Models of Criminal Justice from a Victim’s Perspective, 4(3) International Review 
of Victimology 153, 155 (1996). 
 49)   Carla Del Ponte , Address to the UN Security Council, (September 21, 2000). ICTY Doc. 
JL/P.I.S./542-e of 24 November 2000. 
 50)  Th e UN Agreement’s sole reference to victims states that prosecutors and judges ought to pro-
tect victims and witnesses who are interviewed or called to testify (Article 23: “Th e co-investigating 
judges, the co-prosecutors and the Extraordinary Chambers shall provide for the protection of 
victims and witnesses. Such protection measures shall include, but shall not be limited to, the con-
duct of in camera proceedings and the protection of the identity of a victim or witness”.) 
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
0001102591.indd_PG2254   11   8/27/2009   3:30:26 PM
12 M. Mohan / International Criminal Law Review 9 (2009) 1–43
chamber decisions, which implies that they may become party to the proceed-
ings. 51 On the other hand, Article 38, which states that penalties “shall be limited 
to imprisonment,” seems to exclude companion civil proceedings that usually 
seek compensatory damages. 52 As  Scott Worden notes, the Statute thus left it “up 
to the court and the procedures it adopts to determine whether civil parties be 
allowed to join prosecutions… [and] have a more active and visible role within 
the [ECCC’s] criminal prosecutions” by recourse to Cambodian Law. 53 
 Th e ECCC’s judges did not miss this opportunity. 54 On 13 June 2007, the 
ECCC’s Judicial Committee on the Rules of Procedure (‘ECCC Rules Com-
mittee’), composed of both national and international judges serving in their 
capacity as rule-makers, issued Internal Rules (“2007 Internal Rules”) that pro-
vided for civil party action purporting to confer victims extensive participatory 
rights. 55 Th e ECCC Rules Committee explained the basis and scope of the civil 
party process it had created as follows: “[A] complex issue has been how to ensure 
the rights and involvement of victims. While a familiar element of Cambodian 
law, this was not spelled out in detail in the ECCC Law and Agreement. […] We 
note that the ECCC is a court within the existing court structure of Cambodia. 
 We interpreted this to mean that victims have the right to join as civil parties. However, 
 51)  ECCC Statute, Art 36. (“Th e Extraordinary Chamber of the Supreme Court shall decide appeals 
made by the accused,  the victims , or the Co-Prosecutors against the decision of the Extraordinary 
Chamber of the trial court . . .”) (Emphasis added). 
 52)  ECCC Statute, Art. 38 (“All penalties shall be limited to imprisonment”). Th is provision is 
inconsistent with the stated purpose of civil party action under Article 2 of the Cambodian Criminal 
Procedure Code (‘CPC’). (“Th e purpose of a civil action is to seek compensation for injuries to 
victims of an off ense and with this purpose to allow victims to receive reparation corresponding 
with the injuries they suff ered”). 
 53)   Scott Worden , An Anatomy Of Th e Extraordinary Chambers in  Jaya Ramji &  Beth Van Schaack , 
(eds.) Bringing the Khmer Rouge to Justice: Prosecuting Mass Violence Before the Cambodian 
Courts 206 (Edwin Mellen Press, 2005). 
 54)  Th e civil party process provided for under the Internal Rules borrows from the Cambodian 
Criminal Procedure Code (‘CPC’). 
 55)  Established on 3 July 2006, the Committee on the Rules of Procedure was composed, at the 
time, of three Cambodian and two international judges. Th e Judicial Committee circulated a draft 
set of Internal Rules (IRs) to the rest of the ECCC judges, the Co-Prosecutors, the Principal 
Defender, the Offi  ce of Administration, and interested organizations and individuals. A weeklong 
plenary session was convened on 20 November, 2006, but failed to produce consensus on the con-
tent of the IRs. Th e plenary issued a press statement citing “substantive disagreement” among the 
judges, including on the issue of victim participation. Th e Committee, now made up of fi ve 
Cambodian and four international judges resume work 15 January 2007. On 26 January 2007 the 
Committee, renamed the Internal Rules Review Committee, convened a two-week session to dis-
cuss the disagreement which had arisen in the November plenary. Th e Review Committee con-
vened a two-week session to renew discussion of the draft IRs. Th e IRs were fi nally adopted on 13 
June 2007, 11 months after the establishment of the Committee.  All plenary sessions and the 
Committees’ deliberations were closed to the public and the minutes thereof were declared confi -
dential. My analysis is thus based on offi  cial reports in the media as well as interviews with tribunal 
offi  cials who prefer to remain anonymous. 
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due to the specifi c character of the ECCC, we have decided that only collective, 
non-fi nancial reparation is possible” 56 [Emphasis added]. 
 Under the 2007 Internal Rules, a civil party is a full-fl edged party to the pro-
ceedings against those allegedly responsible for the crimes under investigation by 
the ECCC, and they enjoy the same rights as every other party to the proceed-
ings, such as the Prosecution and the Defense. Specifi cally, a civil party has the 
right, inter alia, to: (a) choose a legal representative; (b) request the investigation 
of alleged crimes; (c) question witnesses and the accused; (c) produce evidence; 
(d) ask the court to take measures to respect their safety, well being, dignity and 
privacy in the course of their participation in the proceedings; (d) access all court 
documentation; and (e) request collective and moral reparations. 57 It is fair to say 
that the civil party is akin to an auxiliary prosecutor - her chief purpose is to par-
ticipate “by supporting the prosecution.” 58 Nonetheless, she remains distinct 
from the ECCC’s Prosecutors, who may be animated by very diff erent concerns. 
Th e Prosecution is solely concerned with trial, verdict and punishment. Becoming 
a civil party not only gives victims the right to actively participate in the proceed-
ings, but it also allows victims to ask the court for collective and moral repara-
tions from the convicted persons. 59 
 Victims’ rights advocates praised the 2007 Internal Rules as “ground-breaking 
because victims will be permitted to join in the proceedings as civil parties,  going 
beyond the regime of victims’ participation before the ICC.” 60 Th eir assessment is 
accurate. Although the Rome Statute is credited with creating “an expansive 
model of international criminal law that encompasses social welfare and restor-
ative justice,” 61 the level of victim involvement at the ICC is “largely symbolic, 
administrative and self-serving; it does not relate to any wider conception of 
 56)  Joint Press Statement by the Committee, Roundup: ECCC Overcomes Complexity, Adopts 
Internal Rules for DK Trials, (Xinhua) (13 June, 2007), at  http://english.peopledaily.com
.cn/200706/13/eng20070613_383831.html (last viewed: 09/10/08). 
 57)  ECCC Internal Rules, R.32; See Gabriela Gonzalez, former Deputy Head of the Victim’s Unit, 
interviewed by Andrew Nette, Locus Standi For Victims at Khmer Rouge Trials?, Inter-Press 
Service, Mar. 25, 2008; See also David Boyle, Th e Rights of Victims, 4(2) Oxford Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 307-313(2006); see ECCC Internal Rules, rules 74 and 105. 
 58)  ECCC Internal Rules, R.23(1) 
 59)  ECCC Internal Rules, R.23(1)(b). Th ese reparations may take the form of an order to publish 
the judgment in any appropriate media at the convicted person’s expense; fund any non-profi t 
activity or service that benefi ts victims; or other appropriate and comparable forms of reparation 
that the Tribunal thinks fi t. See ECCC Internal Rules, R.23(12). 
 60)  Ibid. 
 61)   Alex Little , Balancing Accountability and Victim Autonomy at the International Criminal 
Court, 38 Georgetown Journal of International Law. 315, 369-70 (2007) ; see also  David Donat-
Cattin , Article 68 Protection of the Victims and Witnesses and Th eir Participation in the Proceedings, 
in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 869, 871 ( Otto Triff terer 
ed., 1999), at 873 (“[I]t is clear that the search for the truth—not retribution or punishment of 
given individuals—is the most signifi cant goal of the ICC proceedings.”);  Christopher Muttukumaru , 
Reparation to Victims, in Th e International Criminal Court: Th e Making of the Rome Statute 264 
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 victim or community.” 62 At the ICC, a victim may only present her observations 
if her “personal interests are aff ected.” 63 Even when her personal interests are 
aff ected within the meaning of the Court’s statute, she may only present her 
observations at “stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate  by the 
Court ,” 64 if her observations are “specifi cally relevant to the issues” 65 at hand, and 
provided that these observations are consistent with the rights of the accused and 
a fair and impartial trial. 66 
 At the sentencing stage, the ICC, not the victim, has the discretion to decide 
whether to involve victims and may do so if it is of the opinion that a more com-
plete presentation of fact is required in the “interests of justice,” 67 which suggests 
that victims’ rights are not a paramount consideration for the ICC. 68 In fact, ICC 
judges have held that victim participation is purely  incidental to the effi  cacy 
of the proceedings and not supplementary thereto. 69 Ultimately, therefore, the 
ICC’s process retains power in the hands of the traditional actors of the interna-
tional legal process: the judges, the prosecution and the defense. Th e ICC’s 
Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers have repeated that participation is not a “once-and-
for-all-event.” 70 Victims must submit a new application prior to each hearing or 
( Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) (“Th ere was a gradual realization that there had to be a recognition in the 
Statute that the victims of crimes not only had (as they undoubtedly did) an interest in the prosecu-
tion of off enders but also an interest in restorative justice . . . .”). 
 62)   Ralph Henham Conceptualising access to justice and victims’ rights in international sentencing. 
13 Social & Legal Studies . 27, 27-55 (2004). 
 63)  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted on July 17, 1998, entered into force 
on July 1, 2002, (“Rome Statute”), Art. 68(3). 
 64)  Ibid. 
 65)   Prosecutor v Lubanga Dyilo , Appeals Chamber, Decision,  in limine , on Victim Participation in 
the appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defence against Trial Chamber I’s Decision entitled ‘Decision 
on Victims’ Participation’” of 16 May 2008 (ICC-01/04-01/06-1335), para 50. 
 66)   Prosecutor v Lubanga Dyilo , Decision of the Appeals Chamber on the Joint Application of 
Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 and a/0105/06 concerning the ‘Directions and Decisions of the 
Appeals Chamber’ of 2 February 2007” 13 June 2007 (ICC-01/04-01/06-925), para. 28 (“Even 
when the personal interests of victims are aff ected within the meaning of article 68 (3) of the 
Statute, the Court is still required, by the express terms of that article, to determine that it is appro-
priate for their views and concerns to be presented at that stage of the proceedings and to ensure 
that any participation occurs in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights 
of the accused and a fair and impartial trial”). 
 67)  Rome Statute, Art.65(4)(a). 
 68)   Ralph Henham , Some Issues for Sentencing in the International Criminal Court, 52 Interna-
tional & Comparative Law Quarterly. 81, 108 (2003) (A “realistic assessment suggests that the 
 interests of justice are more likely to be equated with notions of retributive justice than victims’ rights 
and reparation.”) 
 69)  See generally  Prosecutor v Lubanga Dyilo “Decision of the Appeals Chamber on the Joint 
Application of Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 and a/0105/06 concerning the ‘Directions and 
Decisions of the Appeals Chamber’of 2 February 2007” 13 June 2007 (ICC-01/04-01/06-925); see 
also  Prosecutor v Lubanga Dyilo Decision on the participation of victims in the appeal ICC-01/04-
01/06 OA 13, 29 August 2008, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Georghios M. Pikis,  para 8. 
 70)  Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo ( Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo ), Case No. 
ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, Decision on Victims’ Participation, ¶ 101 (Jan. 18, 2008), 
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stage in the proceedings. 71 Th e Chamber then considers on a case-by-case basis 
whether participation is appropriate. 72 Put simply, victims who participate in 
some stages of the proceedings may subsequently be prohibited from participat-
ing in others. 
 By contrast, the ECCC’s Pre-Trial Chamber, in its fi rst decision on civil par-
ticipation, held that civil parties are full-fl edged parties to the criminal proceed-
ings with “active rights to participate…  in all criminal proceedings … starting from 
the investigative stage.” 73 Rejecting the Defense’s arguments, the Chamber held 
that civil party involvement did not prejudice the rights of the Defendant to a fair 
trial. 74 Victim participation at the ICC has, as Judge Pikis has noted, “no immedi-
ate parallel or association with the participation of victims in criminal proceed-
ings [akin to] the Romano-Germanic system of justice, where victims in the role 
of civil parties or auxiliary prosecutors who have a wide-ranging right to partici-
pate in criminal proceedings.” 75 According to Judge Pikis “[i]t is not the victims’ 
domain either to reinforce the prosecution or dispute the defense” at the ICC. 76 
As we have seen, the reverse is true at the ECCC. Civil party action is premised 
on Cambodia’s civil law tradition, which permits a victim to join the ECCC’s 
proceedings, enjoy rights qua victim, and support the prosecution as an auxiliary 
prosecutor. 77 
 2.2. Great Expectations: Th e Promise of Victim-Centrism at the ECCC 
 In sum, the fact that civil party action is a familiar element of Cambodian law, 
criticisms of the  ad hoc tribunals, and the success of civil party action at Nazi war 
crime trials in French courts in the 1990s together ensured a greater role for vic-
tims in proceedings before the ECCC. Each of these factors is underpinned by 
the promise of victim-centrism: the theory that participation in a formal legal 
 71)  ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICC-ASP/1/3, R. 89 
 72)  Rome Statute of the ICC, Art. 68(3). 
 73)  ECCC Pre-Trial Chamber Decision on Civil Party Participation in Provisional Detention 
Appeals, 20 March 2008, para 36, 38. 
 74)  Ibid. 
 75)   Prosecutor v Lubanga Dyilo , Decision of the Appeals Chamber on the Joint Application of 
Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 and a/0105/06 concerning the ‘Directions and Decisions of the 
Appeals Chamber’ of 2 February 2007, June 13, 2007 (ICC-01/04-01/06-925), Separate Opinion 
of Judge Georghios M. Pikis. 
 76)  Ibid, para 16;  Prosecutor v Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the participation of victims in the appeal 
ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 13, August 29, 2008, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Georghios M. Pikis, 
para 10: [“Acknowledging an interest individuating to victims in relation to the holding of a fair 
trial would equate them with a party to the cause, which they are not”.] 
 77)  By fi ling a complaint or becoming a civil party to criminal proceedings, a victim,  inter alia , gains 
access to the case-fi le, may participate in all stages of the proceedings and has the right to claim 
compensatory damages in the event of a conviction. Criminal Procedure Code of the Kingdom of 
Cambodia, Art. 6. 
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process heals victims and restores their dignity. Since the inception of the civil 
party process, the ECCC’s affi  liates have ascribed it several soothing eff ects. 
 Gabriela Gonzalez-Rivas , Deputy Head of the ECCC’s Victim’s Unit, 78 notes: 
“Participation in these types of proceedings is a tool of empowerment [for victim 
civil parties]…People can tell their story, feel that what happened to them is a 
consideration, a recognizing that what happened to them should not have 
happened.” 79 
 H.E.  Sean Visoth , Head of Administration at the ECCC and the top Cambodian 
offi  cial at the Tribunal, believes: “Th e ECCC ensures that victims are aware of 
various avenues through the media and outreach by which they can participate, 
e.g.,. as complainants, witnesses and civil parties, so that their experience with the 
ECCC is rewarding and it relieves some of their suff ering.” 80  Kheat Bophal , head 
of the ECCC’s Victim’s Unit, adds: “Participation restores faith in the justice 
system and provides the fi rst hand-satisfaction of making public the harm suf-
fered.” 81 Th ese promises are laudable, but while they are easy to say, they are, as 
we shall see, easier said than done. 
 3. Methodology 
 Over the years, several quantitative surveys have been conducted on public atti-
tudes towards a Khmer Rouge Tribunal, all of which extol the importance of 
prosecuting leaders of the Khmer Rouge before such a tribunal. 82 Yet, these sur-
veys do not consider the eff ects of the proceedings on current and potential civil 
parties who have begun or have applied to be a part of the process. No studies 
have considered how Cambodian civil parties perceive and respond to this  process, 
 78)  Th e Victim’s Unit is the focal point for victims wishing to participate in the proceedings and the 
unit most frequently in contact with victims. 
 79)   Gabriela González Rivas , deputy head of the ECCC’s victims unit, interview with Seth Mydans 
in Khmer Rouge Tribunal, Victims will not stand idly by, New York Times , June 17, 2008. 
 80)  Reparations Conference, 26 November 2008. 
 81)   Kheat Bophal , head of the Victim’s Unit at the ECCC, Access Victims’ Rights Working Group 
Bulletin, 11, Spring 2008, p.4. In this passage, Bophal acknowledges that victim participation at 
the ECCC is victim-centric because it allows victims to “have their own voice” and “restores” their 
“face in the justice system”, as well as expressive because it allows victims to “denounce the crimes… 
and support the norms and laws” that prohibit their occurrence. 
 82)  For details on some of the results, see generally  Laura McGrew , Truth, Justice, Reconciliation 
and Peace in Cambodia (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: Funded by the Canadian Embassy (Canada 
Funds), February 2000); Th e Khmer Institute of Democracy, Survey on the Khmer Rouge Regime 
and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal 2004, available at  http://www.bigpond.com.kh/ users/kid/KRG-
Tribunal.htm ;  Suzannah Linton , Reconciliation in Cambodia, Documentation Series No.5 (Phnom 
Penh, Cambodia: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2004);  William Burke-White , Preferences 
Matter: Conversations with the Cambodian People on the Prosecution of the Khmer Rouge 
Leadership, in  Jaya Ramji and  Beth Van Schaack , ((eds.)) Bringing the Khmer Rouge to Justice: 
Prosecuting Mass Violence Before the Cambodian Courts, pp. 97-126 (New York: Th e Edwin 
Mellen Press, 2005). 
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even though the ECCC’s pre-trial proceedings – which have included several 
public hearings – began in 2007 and the fi rst trial has commenced. this article 
seeks to begin to fi ll this intellectual void. 
 3.1. What is Participation? 
 Before I set out my research methodology for examining the promises of victim-
centrism at the ECCC, it is critical to examine what is meant by ‘participation’. 
I have explained the modalities of the civil party process in theory, but on what 
normative scale would we measure its eff ects in practice? Victims’ rights discourse 
is unhelpful in this regard as it is dominated by appeals to participation. 83 As one 
commentator puts it, “the idea of … participation is a little like eating spinach: 
no one is against it in principle because it is good for you.” 84 Given this tautology, 
there is a danger that by using the term ‘participation’, and in vaunting its appeal, 
we fail to capture its real signifi cance. 85 
 Discourse on citizenship instructive in this regards. As  Ian Edwards notes, ‘par-
ticipation’ may be said to stem from the concept of citizenship, and may include 
“being in control, having a say, being listened to, or being treated with dignity 
and respect – all aspirations of those within the victim movement; but it may also 
mean providing information whether one wants to or not.” 86 Evidently, participa-
tion has gradations of meaning.  Sherry Arnstein , the late health policy specialist, 
formulated an eight-rung “ladder of participation” that sets out the diff erent 
shades of meaning that the phrase ‘participation’ connotes, ranging from per-
functory inclusion to genuine control ( Table 1 ). 
 83)   Ian Edwards , An Ambiguous Participant: Th e Crime Victim and Criminal Justice Decision-
Making, 44 British Journal of Criminology . 967, 973 (2004). [Hereafter An Ambiguous 
Participant]. 
 84)   Sherry R. Arnstein , A Ladder of Citizen Participation in the USA, 57 J. Royal Town Planning 
Institute, 176,177 (1971). [Hereafter A Ladder of Participation]. 
 85)   Ian Edwards , An Ambiguous Participant, op. cit, at 972-3. 
 86)   Ian Edwards , An Ambiguous Participant: Th e Crime Victim and Criminal Justice Decision-
Making, 44 British Journal of Criminology . 967, 973 (2004). 
 Table 1. Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen Participation 
Degrees of Power Control
Delegated power
Partnership
Placation
Degrees of Tokenism Consultation
Information
Non-participation Th erapy
Manipulation
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 Arnstein ’ s classifi cation distinguishes between real power to aff ect the outcome of 
a process and participation that she considers “empty ritual,” that is, participation 
that purports to promote involvement but only serves to bolster the legitimacy of 
the facilitating or decision-making body or institution. Th e latter, Arnstein argues, 
provides no real benefi ts for participants. Her classifi cation is “designed to be 
provocative,” intended to underscore the gap between real empowerment and the 
maintenance of the  status quo in power relations in the context of US town plan-
ning. 87 Yet, the ladder is a useful point of departure from which to consider the 
diff erent modalities of victim participation and the diff erent ways in which such 
participation may or may not aff ect the process, and by extension, victims’ per-
ceptions. Indeed,  Edwards has used this ladder to propose a typology of victim 
participation within the British criminal justice system. 
 At the lowest rungs of the ladder are  manipulation and  therapy , forms of non-
participation rather than participation, “contrived by some to substitute for gen-
uine participation.” 88 Th ese rungs, according to  Arnstein , operate when persons 
are “placed on rubber stamp advisory committees or advisory bodies” in order to 
engineer their support, thereby “[signifying] the distortion of participation into a 
public relations vehicle by power-holders.” 89  Arnstein is particularly critical of 
participation that amounts to  therapy because it is “dishonest and arrogant”. Such 
(non-) participation occurs when persons are involved only to be subjected to 
“clinical group therapy.” 90 
 Just above these rungs,  Arnstein describes token forms of participation, where 
citizens are  informed of decisions,  consulted about decisions, but with no guaran-
tee that this transfer of knowledge will have any bearing on outcomes. Tokenism 
also includes  placation , which allows greater input and infl uence, although those 
with power continue to retain the right to decide and are not obliged to consider 
participant views. Applying  Arnstein’s classifi cation to victim participation in 
international courts, I would place the role of victim-witnesses at the ad hoc tri-
bunals under the category of  consultation , and the role of victim-participants at 
the ICC under  placation . 
 At the top of  Arnstein’s ladder resides citizen power, which endows participants 
citizens with more “decision-making clout” when participation takes the form of 
 partnerships ,  delegated power , and  citizen control or, put diff erently, when power is 
shared with or conferred to the participant  qua citizen. 91 Th is language of empow-
erment, control and autonomy – in this case of an individual being able to make 
decisions about her own life, have her say before a formal judicial process, and be 
 87)   Sherry Arnstein (1971), op. cit , 176. 
 88)  Ibid., 176 -177 
 89)  Ibid., 176-77. 
 90)  Ibid., 177. 
 91)  Ibid., at 177. 
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the author and arbiter of her own recovery – is espoused by the ECCC’s affi  li-
ates. 92 If these affi  liates are to be believed, Cambodian civil parties enjoy a degree 
of power  qua victim that makes them a  delegate of or  partner to the Prosecution. 
An important feature of these “degrees of power” is that once “the ground-rules 
have been established through some form of give-and-take, they are not subject 
to unilateral change.” 93 To the extent that the ECCC’s civil party process provides 
victims these degrees of power, it may be said to be benefi cial to them. 
 3.2. Scope of Research 
 During the pre-trial phase of the ECCC’s proceedings, 28 civil parties were offi  -
cially recognized, questioned by ECCC judges and prosecutors, interacted with 
ECCC affi  liates and NGO intermediaries and otherwise participated before the 
ECCC. Yet, there is a striking dearth of research on how Cambodian victims of 
mass atrocities perceive their participation before the ECCC. To date, no qualita-
tive or quantitative research has been conducted (or at least published) to shed 
light on this issue, despite the fact that the ECCC’s pre-trial phase began in 2006 
and the fi rst public pre-trial hearing was held in 2007. Th is article seeks to begin 
to fi ll this intellectual void. 
 My research asks how victim participants perceive their participation in the 
ECCC’s process and its eff ects. It relies on the following sources: records of the 
ECCC’s preliminary observations, and judicial decisions and plenary rulings con-
cerning victim participation; on-line web-casts of the ECCC’s public hearings 
and transcripts, which include submissions by civil party lawyers and civil parties; 
journalistic reports on contemporary public sentiment towards the Tribunal pro-
cess and victim participation; and interviews conducted with the key Tribunal 
and civil society informants, including two investigators, two civil party lawyers, 
one prosecutor, three defense counsel, two  members of the Tribunal’s administra-
tion, and three members of the Tribunal’s Victim’s Unit. Importantly, this article 
draws on my fi eld interviews with 24 civil parties, victims and ECCC affi  liates in 
order to examine whether or not the realities of the civil party process are consis-
tent with its promises. this article does not purport to have a large enough repre-
sentative sample to generalize with confi dence about all Cambodian victims, let 
 92)   Ian Edwards , An Ambiguous Participant, op. cit , at 972-73. See also  Diane Orentlicher , Report 
of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/2005/102 (2005), para. 7(originally submitted to the UN Commission on Human Rights in 
1997).As  Diane Orentlicher , UN independent expert tasked with updating the UN Set of Principles 
to combat impunity, notes in the introduction to her report: “[victim] participation helps ensure 
that policies for combating impunity eff ectively respond to victims’ actual needs and, in itself, can 
help reconstitute the  full civic membership of those who were denied the protection of the law in the 
past.” 
 93)   Sherry Arnstein (1971), op. cit , 178. 
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alone all victims of mass atrocity. Instead, it seeks to move beyond vague specula-
tions that victim participation in a legal process is always therapeutic. My research 
yielded a varied analysis of Cambodian victims’ interpretations and identities that 
is distinct from the orthodoxy represented in the extant literature about the thera-
peutic eff ects of victim participation, which I have set out above. 
 4. Victim Participation as Empty Ritual 
 4.1. Victim as Subversive Speaker, not Ventriloquist: Th eary Seng 
 Th eary Seng is the fi rst victim recognized as a civil party, does not fi t this profi le 
of the typical victim. She is a memoirist; a media celebrity; a civil society leader; 
and lawyer. 94 So far, she is the only civil party who has addressed the ECCC 
directly. When given this opportunity, Seng did more than just speak. Proclaiming 
that it was a “right and a privilege for victims to speak before the court”, Seng’s 
fi rst act when faced with alleged genocidaire Noun Chea at the Pre-trial Chamber’s 
public hearing on Feb 8 2008 was to address him directly, using the opportunity 
to publicise a book about post-traumatic stress published by her NGO, the 
Center for Social Development (CSD). 95 
 Seng off ered Noun Chea a copy of this book, saying that she wanted him to 
read it so he would understand more clearly the eff ects of his policies on the 
people of Cambodia. Interestingly, no element of the court – Prosecution, Defense 
nor Judges – protested. Th e Judges even ordered that the bailiff  hand the book to 
Noun Chea. In a decision issued in March 2008, the Pre-Trial Chamber adopted 
a broad interpretation of the civil parties’ right to participate, stating that the 
Internal Rules are “clear in [their] wording that Civil Parties can participate in  all 
criminal proceedings…” and that “Civil Parties have  active rights to participate 
starting from the investigative stage of the procedure.” 96 Th e Judges rejected the 
Defense’s argument that civil parties should not participate in pre-trial proceed-
ings. 97 Victims’ rights advocates have welcomed the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision 
as “a landmark decision in international criminal justice and a major achievement 
for victims of gross human rights violations, whose voices have long gone 
 94)  For more information on Th eary Seng, her background and her accomplishments see <  http://
www.thearyseng.com/ >. 
 95)  A web-cast of February 2008 pre-trial hearing is available at <  http://www.cambodiatribunal
.org/ >. 
 96)   Decision on Civil Party Participation in Provisional Detention Appeals (20 March 2008) 002/
19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC01) para 36 (Pre-Trial Chamber, ECCC). 
 97)   Decision on Civil Party Participation in Provisional Detention Appeals (20 March 2008) 002/
19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC01) para 5 (Pre-Trial Chamber, ECCC). 
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unheard.” 98 One advocate jubilantly claimed that the decision “set an important 
precedent in the interpretation of the rules applicable to civil party participation 
before the ECCC.” 99 
 Yet, a mere four months later in July 2008, the same Chamber took a markedly 
diff erent approach towards Seng. When Seng asked to address the court during 
proceedings concerning Ieng Sary’s appeal against provisional detention, just as 
she had in Noun Chea’s case, the Defense objected on the ground that she was 
not called to the Cambodian Bar. Agreeing with the Defense, the judges denied 
Seng’s request to speak, ruling that since she had legal representation, she could 
only speak through her lawyer. Seng promptly dismissed her lawyer and requested 
once again that she be heard as an unrepresented civil party. Th e Judges refused 
her request, seemingly impatient with her repeated attempts to speak. Relying on 
Internal Rule 77(10), which provides that, in pre-trial appeals, “the Co-Prosecutors 
and the lawyers for the parties may present brief observations”, the majority of 
the Chamber held that it was “clear” that only civil party  lawyers could address 
it, regardless of the fact that civil parties had, by virtue of being parties to the 
proceedings, legal standing. 100 Th e Chamber’s three-paragraph decision is 
misconceived. 
 Properly construed, the 2007 Internal Rules did not require a civil party to be 
represented by a lawyer. In fact, they expressly provided that she had the right to 
request reparations without the assistance of a lawyer, strongly suggesting that she 
was within her rights to address the bench in person. 101 Further, according to the 
2007 Internal Rules, there is a fundamental obligation that “proceedings shall be 
fair and adversarial and preserve a balance between the rights of the parties.” 102 As 
such, Seng, as a party to the proceedings, should have been granted a right to 
speak, not silenced simply because she had no lawyer. Yet, this is what happened: 
a disheartened Seng stormed out of the courtroom, vowing not to return until 
“[she has] a voice.” 103 
 98)  Joint Press Release issued by established international victims’ rights organizations titled, 
Cambodia Tribunal Allows Victims of the Khmer Rouge to Participate in Proceedings, 28 March 
2008, on fi le with author. 
 99)  International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) Cambodia Tribunal Allows Victims of 
Khmer Rouge to Participate in Proceedings (28 March 2008) available at  www.fi dh.org/spip
.php?article5386 (accessed 15 August 2008.) 
 100)   Written Version of Oral Decision of 1 July 2008 on the Civil Party’s Request to Address the Court in 
Person (3 July 2008) 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ(PTC03) para 3 (Pre-Trial Chamber, ECCC). 
 101)  ECCC Internal Rules, Rule 23(7) (Any Victim participating in proceedings before the ECCC 
as a Civil Party has the right to be represented by a national lawyer, or a foreign lawyer in collabora-
tion with a national lawyer, as follows…) 
 102)  ECCC Internal Rules, Rule 21(1) (a). 
 103)   Georgia Wilkins , Victims in Emotional, Legal Limbo over Participation at the KR Trial, Phnom 
Penh Post, Sept. 11, 2008. A web-cast of this pre-trial hearing is available at <  http://www
.cambodiatribunal.org/ >. 
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 It appears that the shift in the Chamber’s attitude away from victim participa-
tion can be attributed to their “disinclination to hear from [Seng] rather than upon 
a correct reading of the Internal Rules.” 104 Some say that Seng compromised the 
nascent civil party process, threatening to unravel it even before the trials began. 
According to Sarah Th omas, a legal fellow based at a local NGO: “ Despite seeking 
to further victims’ rights, [Seng] has done victims a great disservice by demanding a 
robust scheme for civil party participation so early in the proceedings … Th e Judges 
had – until this time – adopted a very progressive approach. When, however, the 
civil party sought to force their hand, the Judges responded negatively, restricting 
opportunities for direct participation for all civil parties” 105 [Emphasis added]. 
 A senior ECCC offi  cial I spoke to was more blunt: “Th eary Seng is manipulat-
ing the process. I do not think that the process will be well managed if we allow 
[her] to stand on her soapbox…  I used to think highly of victim participation, but 
I realize that individual victims cannot be allowed to speak in court as they are emo-
tional. Judges do not want to hear only about their mental anguish alone, that is for 
a psychiatrist, not a court of law. Common legal representation is necessary ” 106 
[Emphasis added]. 
 Such reasoning spurred the ECCC’s Rules Committee to back-pedal on some 
of the initial rights it gave to civil parties. On 5 September 2008, two months 
after Seng was denied the chance to address the court directly during Ieng Sary’s 
appeal against his provisional detention on the basis she had legal representation, 
the ECCC Rules Committee amended the Internal Rules to regulate civil party 
involvement in court. 107 Victims are now required to apply at least 10 days ahead 
of an initial hearing if they want to be civil parties. 108 Th e Rules Committee also 
gave ECCC judges – of which it is part - the power to compel civil parties into 
groups with a single common lawyer representing them. 109 More recently, on 6 
March 2009, the Internal Rules were amended once more to specify that where a 
lawyer represents a civil party, it is the lawyer and not the civil party herself who 
must address the Tribunal. 110 
 104)  See comments by lawyer Sarah Th omas, available at < http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/search/
label/ECCC?max-results=20. > 
 105)   Sarah Th omas , Civil Party’s Repeated Attempts to Address Bench and Poor Management of 
Proceedings Force Worrying Precedent for Victim Participation Before the ECCC, available at 
http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/search/label/ECCC?max-results=20 
 106)  Author’s interview with a senior ECCC offi  cial (anonymity preferred), 2 December 2008. 
 107)   Georgia Wilkins , Victims in Emotional, Legal Limbo over Participation at the KR Trial, Phnom 
Penh Post, Sept.11, 2008. 
 108)  ECCC Internal Rules, Rule 24(3) [introduced on 5 September 2008]. As a consequence, as 
detailed in the press release, the application made by Norng Chanphal, a surviving victim of S-21, was 
rejected as it was submitted to the Court two days after the deadline. I will set out his story below. 
 109)  ECCC Internal Rules, Rule 24(8)(a)(b) [introduced on 5 September 2008]. 
 110)  ECCC Internal Rules, Rule 24(7)(i) [introduced on 6 March 2009]. Th e amended Rules states 
that it does not apply where a Civil Party is being interviewed, and do not prevent a Civil Party 
from answering questions put to him or her by the Chamber. 
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 Th e ECCC Rules Committee sought to justify its recent amendments to the 
Internal Rules as follows: “ Th e amendments do not limit the rights of Civil Parties 
but instead, modify the manner in which these rights are to be exercised , due to the 
extremely large number of Civil Parties before ECCC proceedings, and the 
impracticability of concluding trials expeditiously if all Civil Parties were allowed 
to intervene on any matter at any stage of proceeding. … Th e signifi cant involve-
ment of victims is a notable feature of ECCC proceedings and the Court’s practice in 
this area is expected to be watched closely by other international Tribunals, in particu-
lar the International Criminal Court, whose Statute and Rules contain similar provi-
sions ” 111 [Emphasis added]. 
 Regardless of the semantic distinction that the Committee sought to draw 
between ‘limit’ and ‘modify’, its amendments to the Internal Rules have far-
reaching consequences. Th e Rules Committee’s amendments have abridged civil 
parties’ active rights to participate in all criminal proceedings as equal partici-
pants, undermining the very spirit of the civil party process it fi rst established. 
Th ese amendments are tantamount to a procedural reversal of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s much applauded decision of March 2008. 112 More signifi cantly, they 
run counter to statements made by the ECCC’s affi  liates and intermediaries to 
victims on the basis of the original Internal Rules. 
 After calling for unprecedented victim participation that, as I explained earlier, 
promised Cambodian victims more rights than those contemplated by the ICC, 
the ECCC appears to have reneged. Civil party victims at the ECCC now have 
fewer rights than their non-party counterparts at the ICC, who can address the 
court if the Judges deem that their contribution serves the interests of justice. By 
precluding civil parties from addressing the ECCC directly, save for when they 
asked questions by Judges, the Rules Committee has, I argue, undermined victim 
participation at the ECCC. Civil parties have been procedurally lowered from 
their position on Arnstein’s ladder where they appeared to hold a degree of par-
ticipatory power as the Prosecution’s partners, to a position that is, at best, sheer 
tokenism, and at worst, manipulation (see  Table 1 , above). 
 I am not suggesting that the ECCC should forsake practical considerations 
and allow every civil party to make individual interventions during the trial pro-
cess. Undoubtedly, there are bound to be gaps between the ECCC’s promise 
and its operational impact. However, these gaps should prompt a vigorous self-
examination on the ECCC’s part, not a retroactive restriction of victims’ rights. 
Concerns about practicality and expedience, though merited, are often self-
referential. Th ey are a safe-refuge for legal conservatism: judges who may fear that 
 111)  5 th Plenary Session of Judicial Offi  cers, Closing Press Statement, 6 March 2009, available 
at < http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/press/101/closing_plenary_session_EN.pdf >. 
 112)   Decision on Civil Party Participation in Provisional Detention Appeals (20 March 2008) 002/
19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC01) para 36 (Pre-Trial Chamber, ECCC). 
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victims may not bend to the will of their endeavour, defense lawyers who may 
fear that victims may strengthen the elbow of the prosecution, and prosecutors 
who may fear that victims may show them up. 
 Vilifying civil parties and valorising the internationalized criminal process, 
without seeking to query or understand the former’s distinct perspective or the 
shortcomings of the latter may send the message that the ECCC is not particu-
larly interested in entertaining the views and voices of victims and civil parties. 
It is convenient to dismiss Seng’s conduct, as her critics do, as being disruptive, 
but there is more to her story. Th e amendments to the Internal Rules on victims 
participation that were prompted, in part, by Seng’s conduct, underscore a ten-
sion that has emerged at the ECCC – not the traditional opposition between the 
powerless victim and the savage perpetrator; but between the capable (if diffi  -
cult) victim and the aloof Tribunal. Seng sees herself, she admitted to me, as a 
conduit for Cambodian victims in general; someone who can give them a voice, 
and translate and convey their desires within the strictures of the legal process: “I 
rushed to become the fi rst civil party to help shape the process, and it took a bit 
of time. I saw the potential to engage the process and the court in a meaningful 
way and I knew that I could use my background as a Cambodian victim in a 
legal sense…. I am aware of my unique position as a Cambodian victim in that 
regard and as an American-trained lawyer.  I am also aware that because of my work 
engaging the Cambodian public I do have an understanding of what it is they want 
and I felt, I don’t want to be dramatic or boastful, but I felt I could translate the 
voices and somehow incorporate that into myself and use that voice, my voice as a 
vehicle to translate those desires and the suff ering within this court 113 [Emphasis 
added]. 
 Besides serving as a communal translator, Seng also feels that she is entitled to 
be heard in her own right. To tell the story of her personal suff ering as a child 
victim and orphan on her own terms: “ But otherwise I am not unique so this is why 
when people look at me, superfi cially they don’t understand that I lived during that 
time period and the suff ering, my suff ering I have gone through a certain suff ering, 
so allow me to hear the suff ering of Cambodians and help translate that, so to me 
knowing that  I have uniqueness of two voices and this court is an international 
instrument ” 114 [Emphasis added]. 
 Seng’s proclamation that she is worthy of representing “two voices” – hers and 
that of the community of victims – is contested, as we shall see, by other members 
of that community. Yet it demonstrates that she has reconfi gured her role in the 
process. On the basis of her authority as a civil party who has been promised a 
 113)  Author’s interview and conversation with civil party Th eary Seng, 30 November 2008, 1 
December 2008 Transcripts of conversation on fi le with author. 
 114)  Author’s interview with civil party Th eary Seng, 1 December 2008. Transcripts of conversation 
on fi le with author. 
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chance to voice her own perspective, 115 Seng has remade herself into what  Linda 
Alcoff  and  Laura Gray term a “subversive speaker”: that is, a survivor who is (self ) 
authorized to be both witness and expert: both reporter and theorist of 
experience. 116 
When an expert is called for,  Alcoff  and  Gray opine that a survivor’s narratives 
are often “recuperated” to reinforce dominant social relations and power struc-
tures. To enable subversive speaking, the role of the expert must be eliminated or 
reconfi gured, and the split between direct experience and third-party interpreta-
tion must be erased. 117 
 Th at is precisely what Seng sought to do. Once she was conferred the status of 
‘civil party’, Seng saw herself not only as having a right of audience before the 
ECCC, but a duty to breathe life into the civil party process: “When Nuon Chea 
was fi rst arrested I rushed to fi le, but …there was no form! Th ere was no Victim’s 
Unit! Th e court had not resolved these issues. Duch was arrested earlier and no 
one applied to be a civil party! It was one of those things where people were con-
tent with the idea, with the theory but did not have the time, experience or 
energy, or depth to pursue it. So the onus fell on victims like me to shape [the 
process] and to see that it does not become illusory.” 118 
 Even after the Victim’s Unit was established and proceeded to assign her a 
lawyer, Seng saw little need for this formal interpolator. Seng did not wish to have 
her experiences re-presented by another person, another lawyer; especially when, 
regardless of his apparent competence and ability as an advocate, her lawyer could 
not have nor appreciate her expertise, suff ering or gendered perspective. By dis-
charging her lawyer, Seng was indeed subverting the civil party process. She used 
her testimony and memory as “tools of intervention” rather than “instruments for 
recuperation”, and thereby “alter[ed] existing subjectivities as well as structures of 
domination and relations of power” that placed the law at the center of the pro-
cess rather than her. 119 As she articulated: “I wasn’t sure how much room I had to 
say, when in court, to shift direction, because I had a lawyer… I think the national 
lawyers were not thinking about the issue, they were from public interest organi-
zations and had been given one week or two weeks to think about this whereas  I 
have been thinking about the CP participation, what it means for a long time. …For 
 115)  In Seng’s words, her role is “to give voice to that which has not been heard before and that voice 
is really important to the legal process but more so than the legal process, to the larger search for 
justice”. 
 116)   Linda Alcoff  &  Laura Gray . Survivor Discourse: Transgression or Recuperation? 18 Signs 260, 
282 (1993). 
 117)  Roseanne Kennedy,  Subversive Witnessing: Mediating Indigenous testimony in Australian cultural 
and legal institutions, 36 Wom. Stud. Q. 1, 58, 62 (2008). 
 118)  Author’s interview with civil party Th eary Seng, 1 December 2008. Transcripts of conversation 
on fi le with author. 
 119)  Alcoff , Linda, & Gray, Laura.  Survivor Discourse: Transgression or Recuperation? 18 Signs 260, 
282 (1993). 
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me, there was a diff erent level of analysis; as in, why can’t I articulate this, my story, 
by myself? Why do I have to go through another voice? … Because of my dual back-
ground, I thought I could articulate what should be said. Th at was limited because my 
lawyer is a man. He is brilliant, but because of his legal education in the rigid system 
here, he is further limited. I felt these frustrations ” 120 [Emphasis added]. 
 Victim participation is supposed to be empowering, but that exhilarating high 
can quickly disappear when the opportunity for such expression vanishes and 
when a victim is displaced from her perceived place at the top of  Arnstein’s ladder 
( control ) and is forced to cling on to the bottom rung ( non-participation ). Th is 
was Seng’s experience. Speaking at the Reparations Conference about the way in 
which she has been silenced by the Tribunal, Seng was reduced to tears: “I would 
like to remind the ECCC offi  cials and judges here not to take my suff ering for 
granted. You allowed me to become a civil party. Give me, give us [civil parties] 
the voice that you promised. Do not play with the hearts and the souls of the 
victims and my (dead) parents. Justice must be transparent, if not it will not 
count for anything, and you will have a real problem on your hands.” 121 
 4.2. Victim as Individual, Not Tribe – Sum Rithy & Chin Navy 
 Tensions arise not only between victims and the Tribunal, they manifest between 
victims as well. As I have explained, a victim is defi ned under the Internal Rules 
as a person who suff ered harm – physical, material or psychological – at the hands 
of the Khmer Rouge. Th e ECCC’s affi  liates suggest that all Cambodian victims 
who fall under this defi nition are created equal: that is, they have an equal right 
to participate in the process. 122 Veteran NGO activist, Jeudy Ong, however, dis-
agrees: “Victims usually prefer to fi ll out and submit civil party applications as 
individuals. Th ey submit their applications to us specifying what they endured. 
Each individual suff ered diff erent tings.  Each victim wants, and should be encour-
aged, to make a distinct statement of what they suff ered, as this will inform requests 
for reparations” [Emphasis added]. 123 
 Sum Rithy is one such victim who desires to stand apart from others. Sum, 
who was detained in a Khmer Rouge prison in Siem Reap for two years, told me 
that individual reparation should be available to prisoners like him. Sum recounts 
that more than 150 people were also interred at that prison, but that he is amongst 
only a handful of survivors who are still alive. “Th e prison was very similar to Tuol 
 120)  Author’s interview with civil party Th eary Seng, 1 December 2008. Transcripts of conversation 
on fi le with author. 
 121)  Reparations Conference, 26 November 2008. 
 122)  Author’s interview with Keat Bophal, Head of the ECCC’s Victim’s Unit, 11 December 2008 
(“amongst (those recognized as) civil parties, we must realise that all are victims…we cannot say 
that some suff ered less or more”). Transcript on fi le with author. 
 123)  Reparations conference, 27 November 2008. 
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
0001102591.indd_PG2254   26   8/27/2009   3:30:26 PM
 M. Mohan / International Criminal Law Review 9 (2009) 1–43 27
Sleng, although I think that my fellow prisoners and I suff ered more,” Sum told 
me. “Th e Khmer Rouge soldiers poured hot porridge on me and tortured me for 
no reason, it was hell on earth. I don’t think you can ever understand what I am 
talking about. I have seen hell and survived.” 124 
 Sum feels that there is a hierarchy of suff ering. He believes that a distinction 
should be drawn between prisoners like him – “true victims” – and those who 
were interred for a short period of time (like Seng), others who were spared 
imprisonment, and still others who suff ered psychological or material harm rather 
than physical harm as a result of what happened to their property or their loved 
ones. In his eyes, these other ‘fake’ victims should not be placed on the same foot-
ing as him, nor enjoy the same claim to reparations, even if they are designed to 
be symbolic rather than monetary: “ I am a true victim because I was in prison and 
I was tortured for a long time. I was treated very cruelly in prison. People like 
Th eary Seng and others did not go through as much. I suff ered so much more. I 
am the real victim of the Khmer Rouge. Her 15 days in prison are important, but 
I was there for two years. I am still a victim of the Khmer Rouge because they 
have not been held responsible for their terrible crimes” 125 [Emphasis added]. 
 To Sum, the title of civil party is an emblem of victimhood that he feels deserves 
a special status. Th is is partly the reason why he came forward to be a civil party, 
braving warnings that the ECCC’s trials would end up being little better than the 
trials of the People’s Revolutionary Tribunal (PRT) that took place in 1979. 126 He 
said: “ I was told that a civil party is a special victim. Now that I am a civil party, 
I want the court to respect me as a special person. If there is a plane crash, the survi-
vor is very important, right?  All survivors, especially prison victims like me, should 
be respected and recognized as important too. Th e court should make a card for me 
that says I am a civil party, a former prisoner, so that no one will look down on me. 
Since the court treats the defendants as very important people, shouldn’t we be 
treated as people who are even more important?” 127 [Emphasis added]. 
 Yet, Sum says that the process has not lived up to his expectations. Sum feels 
that he is little more than a sideshow, not the central fi gure or “special victim” that 
he was told he would be. He has not had a chance to speak in court, despite 
 124)  Author’s interview with civil party Sum Rithy, 6 December 2008. 
 125)   Ibid. 
 126)  Author’s interview with civil party Sum Rithy, 6 December 2008. Coming forward was not an 
easy decision for Sum Rithy. He told me that a family member had advised against it. Advice he 
feels, on hindsight, that he ought to have heeded: “I have a close friend who was also imprisoned in 
Siem Reap just like me. Th is female friend was part of the PRT in 1979. She has also made a com-
plaint before the present Tribunal as well, but when I asked her to become a civil party, she refused. 
She gave me some advice. She said ‘be careful, you will be cheated by the court and the government 
and you may be killed’.  At that time, I said nothing. I just listened to her advice and she repeated it 
several times to me. Looking at my position right now, I think I should have listened to her ” [Emphasis 
added]. 
 127)  Ibid. 
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 various requests. He is rarely consulted and he fi nds the legal process, both court 
hearings and meetings with his lawyers, boring and often incomprehensible. 128 As 
Sum pithily puts it - “it is always about the law, what about the victims? When 
the court needs us, they ask us to come, but when they don’t need us they kick us 
out.” 129 
 Another civil party, Chin Navy, considers herself as ‘special’ as Sum Rithy (or 
more so). Navy disagrees with Sum’s statement that victims of physical harm 
should trump or have a greater claim to victimhood, and reparations, than vic-
tims of psychological harm. “My brain is stuck on what happened in April 1975 
when the Khmer Rouge took over”, Navy told me. “I was forced to evacuate 
Phnom Penh. I feared for my life and I ran. As I fl ed to my village in Takeo prov-
ince on foot, all I saw were bodies covered with plastic.” 130 Navy’s greatest suff er-
ing stems from the loss of her husband who was executed for being a suspected 
Central Intelligence Agency (‘CIA’) spy. 
 Yet, this is not a story that the Tribunal has thus far desired to hear. Navy has 
not been granted an opportunity to address the Tribunal. Th e following exchange 
at the Reparations Conference between Navy and a Tribunal offi  cial is revelatory 
of ECCC affi  liates’ reluctance to engage civil parties: 
 Offi  cial: “Aunty, I am sorry to interrupt you. I know you suff ered. But we are here to listen to 
your views on reparations.” 
  Chin Navy:  (persistently) “Yes, but how can I tell you what I want before I tell you my story?” 
 Offi  cial: “Th ere will be another opportunity for you to tell your story. Now we are at a Conference, 
 I need to know what you think is appropriate reparations.” 
 Chin Navy: ( shows photo of husband to audience ) “I want individual reparations for all victims, 
especially widows like me who have suff ered the most…Th is is the only remaining property of 
my husband that I have left. He was tortured and killed at Tuol Sleng prison. What are you 
going to do about it? Do you understand my pain? 
  Offi  cial: (Silence) 131 
 Neither Sum nor Navy are content that the Tribunal will only provide collec-
tive, not individual, reparations at the conclusion of the trials is untenable to both 
Sum and Navy. In their minds, they were invited by the Tribunal to come for-
ward; they were asked to reveal and relive their traumatic pain and suff ering by 
 128)  Author’s interview with civil party Sum Rithy, 6 December 2008. When I asked Sum Rithy 
about how he would characterise his role at the court so far and what he thinks of the civil party 
process, he had this to say: “ Th e court treats us badly…. I have never had a chance to speak in court. 
I just listen to my lawyers when they speak in court. And they can be very boring. I hardly understand 
what goes on in court…I want to question the defendants, but they [the Tribunal] say no”. When 
I asked him if he had asked his lawyers to explain what transpires, he said: “I meet my lawyers once 
a month, but they are too busy to explain things to me. Anyway, these meetings are also about the 
law and very boring”. (Emphasis added). Author’s interview with civil party Sum Rithy, 6 December 
2008. 
 129)  Ibid. 
 130)  Author’s interview with civil party Chin Navy, 4 December 2008. 
 131)  Reparations Conference, 26 November 2008. Notes of conference on fi le with author. 
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completing the civil party application process; to forsake their anonymity and put 
their safety at risk; and fi nally, to attend numerous hearings and lawyer’s meetings 
that were incomprehensible. At the Reparations Conference, Cambodian Judge 
Kong Srim, President of the ECCC’s Supreme Chamber, told a room full of civil 
parties that “compensation cannot be done for individuals.” 132 When I spoke to 
Navy about how she felt about what Judge Kong had said, she balked: “I heard 
him, but I disagree. US$100 million is being spent on the Tribunal. If there is no 
individual compensation, there is no justice in this entire world. Th ey are still 
allowing those bad people to continue to abuse others and commit more evil 
deeds. I have suff ered so much, so much more than many others. Individual repa-
rations are a must because I personally come down and have attended many 
meetings so far. 133 
 When I spoke to Sum about the same, he became visibly upset and wondered 
if he should withdraw from the process: “I was told that we would get ‘collective” 
and ‘moral’ reparations. I thought that this could include some fi nancial compen-
sation, at least for the eff ort it takes for me to get to this far-away court.  When I 
was told by my lawyers that the court would not even give me this, I feel that they are 
threatening me. It feels so familiar. I cannot believe that there will be no individual 
reparations; that the court wants to shut my mouth. Actually, if there are no individ-
ual reparations, it means the court does not respect me. Maybe I should take back my 
civil party application ” 134 [Emphasis added]. 
 Sum and Navy’s insistence that they are entitled to fi nancial rather than non-
fi nancial reparations in the event of conviction could be because the distinction 
between both forms of reparation occasionally gets lost in translation. 135 However, 
it is equally likely that Sum and Navy view non-fi nancial reparations as an insub-
stantial form of redress which they were unwilling to accept. 136 In the course of 
the Reparations Conference, Sum Rithy pressed Judge Kong Srim to answer why 
a civil party victim like him should not be entitled to fi nancial compensation as 
 132)   Ibid . 
 133)  Author’s interview with civil party Chin Navy, 4 December 2008. 
 134)  Author’s interview with civil party Sum Rithy, 6 December 2008. 
 135)  Taing Hun, Director of Cambodian branch of NGO International Center for Conciliation, 
speaking at the Reparations Conference confi rmed that “the Khmer (Cambodian) phrase for ‘repa-
rations’ can be construed to mean fi nancial “compensation” and this can be taken to mean that 
money damages/compensation will be awarded to victims. 
 136)  As a civil society leader I spoke with remarked: “With victims, their emotions overwhelm them 
and even if you tell them once that there will be no money, because they want it, their mind is set, 
they hear you but then it’s lost. Because they have already made up their minds that there is going 
to be redress, that there is going to be reparations of a certain kind. … it (the fact that there is no 
provision for individual reparations) needs to be repeated again and again. Th e lawyers think “Oh 
I said it!” but that does not mean it was eff ectively communicated. I think they (civil society and 
the Tribunal) are trying their best, and they have information but they are not communicating it 
properly. You need to know whether it has been received at a level that sticks and can be accepted 
and internalized by the victims.” Author’s interview with civil society leader (Anonymity preferred), 
4 December 2008. 
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redress for his suff ering. Judge Kong replied, to applause from the audience, 
“although the Internal Rules do not provide for individual reparations, I will take 
your concerns into account and see what we can do”. 137 When I asked Sum at the 
conclusion of the Reparations Conference what he made of Judge Kong’s state-
ment and if it had restored his faith in the civil party process, he told me that he 
did not believe the Judge’s “polite lie”, as it was purely meant to pacify him. 138 
 When faced with the ECCC’s attempts to pay lip service to their comments 
and feelings shortly after promises of genuine participation, Sum Rithy likened 
the ECCC to its show-trial predecessor, the much-criticized 1979 People’s 
Revolutionary Tribunal, 139 or even a return to the  Angkar . Poignantly likening his 
memories to a pentimento, which peels back to reveal an arduous personal tale 
that he feels the Tribunal does not give credence to, Sum said that he felt disillu-
sioned. Sum expressed mistrust in the legitimacy of the ECCC and its local and 
foreign affi  liates: “I am like an old piece of paper with creases. Now the paper is 
blank, but there is a story behind the creases. I think they (the Tribunal) do not 
really want the people to know what happened.  Hun Sen wants to erase everything 
that happened during the Pol Pot time, maybe even my memory. Th e Barangs (for-
eigners) are no better. I feels that nothing changes. Th is Tribunal is just like Angkar ” 140 
[Emphasis added]. 
 4.3. One Crime Site, Many Desires: Chum Mey, Bou Meng, Van Naath 
 Sum Rithy is a former prisoner, and Chin Navy a widow. Each arrogates centrality 
for his/her individual pain and claim to victimhood. Each feels he/she suff ered more 
than the other did. Th is is not a phenomenon peculiar to these two victims, but a 
trait common to many other victims I interviewed as well. Each individual story, 
and claim to victimhood, is separate from the next. Interestingly, I found that even 
victims who have suff ered a similar plight in the same site subscribe to very diff erent 
values, and have very diff erent identities, views and desires for vindication. 
 Civil parties Chum Mey and Bou Meng and Prosecution witness Van Naath 
are among a handful of survivors of the notorious Khmer Rouge S-21 prison 
where 17,000 persons were tortured and perished. Th ey all underwent  tremendous 
 137)  Reparations Conference, 26 November 2008. 
 138)  Author’s interview with civil party Sum Rithy, 6 December 2008. 
 139)  In 1979, senior Khmer Rouge leaders Pol Pot and Ieng Sary were accused of genocide at the 
People’s Revolutionary Tribunal established in Phnom Penh by the newly installed, Vietnamese-
controlled government. Th e trials were held, and the accused convicted of genocide,  in abstentia . 
Due to the animus of the proceedings, they are widely regarded as show-trial staged by the 
aggressors/victors without any clear governing laws or respect for due process. In fact, the  defence 
lawyer for the two accused persons, siding with the prosecution, described her clients as “criminally 
insane monsters” who deserved to be condemned to death. See generally  David Chandler , Will 
Th ere Be a Trial for the Khmer Rouge? 14 Ethics & International Aff airs. 67 (2006). 
 140)  Author’s interview with civil party Sum Rithy, 6 December 2008. 
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 141)  Author’s interview with civil party Chum Mey, 25 November 2008. 
 142)  Author’s interview with civil party Chum Mey, 2 December 2008. 
 143)   See generally Ian Harris , “Onslaught on Beings”: A Th eravada Buddhist Perspective on 
Accountability for Crimes Committed in the Democratic Kampuchea Period, in  Jaya Ramji &  Beth 
Van Schaack , ((eds.)) Bringing the Khmer Rouge to Justice: Prosecuting Mass Violence Before the 
Cambodian Courts 206 (Edwin Mellen Press, 2005). 
 144)  Author’s interview with civil party Chum Mey, 2 December 2008. (“I need an apology – not 
just verbal, but the judgment of the court is critical. As long as they talk about their story and make 
a genuine apology, I may forgive them… Th ey can have a chance to formally apologise after the 
trial. I will forgive. I always remember that if a dog bites me, I cannot bite the dog back as I am not 
a crazy as the dog. In addition to the apology, I would like Tuol Sleng to be converted into a geno-
cide museum and for it to be about the victims and not about the Khmer Rouge and the skulls 
everybody talks about. I also need some form of individual reparations even if it is just $1, it will be 
signifi cant to me.”) 
cruelty at the hands of the commandant of that prison, Duch, who is  currently 
on trial. Yet, each survivor is a very diff erent person – and none of them individu-
ally nor all of them put together, can truly be said to be representative of a larger 
group of Cambodian victims. “Th ey tortured me for three months,” Chum Mey 
said, recalling his time as a prisoner. “Th ey beat me. Th ey removed my toenails. 
Th ey gave me electric shocks in my ear—kup-kup-kup-kup, it sounded like a 
machine in my head, and my eyes were burning.” Chum is one of the civil parties 
who wish to question Duch. “I want to stay alive to give evidence,” he said. 
“Because I survived the Khmer Rouge, and if I die before the trial, what was the 
point of surviving?” 141 
 Chum came forward to be a civil party in the hope that the ECCC’s promise 
of relief through participation would vindicate his survival. In addition to telling 
his story in court as an eye-witness to the torture and killings that transpired in 
S-21, Chum wants to do what witnesses cannot: to personally ask Duch those 
questions that have gone unanswered. Although Chum has made repeated requests 
to confront Duch and put questions to him, he has not been permitted to do so: 
“ Th ey call it an extraordinary court but then in practice it is not so extraordinary. I did 
not do anything wrong. Why did they torture me? Th ey killed my wife and my 
children and they did not do anything wrong. Why did they kill my family? 
I want to ask Duch directly.  I want to ask this myself, not through a lawyer … I have 
asked for this opportunity many times, I thought I had the right to do this as a victim 
party, but I have never had a chance to speak in court ” 142 [Emphasis added]. 
 Despite the pain he has suff ered, Chum eschews vengeance and prefers a 
Th eravada Buddhist approach to the trials. 143 Chum would rather show compas-
sion than mimic their violence. He feels that he can forgive the Khmer Rouge 
leaders if they are repentant and held legally accountable by the Tribunal for the 
crimes they allegedly committed. Chum would like the prison where he was tor-
tured to become a memorial or a museum, and for his suff ering to be individually 
acknowledged, even if only symbolically. 144 Failing this, Chum says that partici-
pating in the trials could augur well for national reconciliation, “if my generation 
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 145)  Author’s interview with civil party Chum Mey, 2 December 2008. 
 146)  Author’s interview with civil party Bou Meng, 25 November 2008. 
 147)  Ibid. 
 148)  Ibid. 
 149)  Ibid. 
 150)  Author’s interview with civil party Bou Meng, 25 November 2008. 
can kill each other we should do something to avoid it happening again and heal 
wounds in our society.” 145 Chum’s friend and fellow former Toul Sleng prisoner, 
Bou Meng, on the other hand, is not as easily appeased. 
 Bou lost his wife to the Khmer Rouge. He believes the only reason he survived 
was because of his skill as a painter. “Th ey asked me to draw a picture of Brother 
Number One, Pol Pot. Th ey said your pictures must be 100 per cent accurate. 
If they aren’t, we’ll kill you and you’ll be fertiliser on the rice fi elds.” 146 Bou says that 
he will only be able to reconcile with the past if he receives US$50,000 from the 
Tribunal. 147 I asked him why he had such a precise fi gure in mind, and if this may 
seem like more of a pay-off  than a tribute. Displeased, Bou lifted his shirt to reveal 
a deep laceration that trailed across his bare back. “Look at this, and then you ask me 
the question again,” he retorted. 148 Th e wound may have healed, but the emotional 
damage has not. “Th ere is a scar on my back which also scars my soul,” Bou said. 
I want them (the judges) to make Duch admit his guilt, not remain quiet. I want 
compensation of $50,000 for my wife’s death. He executed my wife. If it happened 
to the judges’ wives, how would they feel? Would US$50,000 be enough?” 149 
 At fi rst glance, we may seek to brush aside Bou’s frustration at the Tribunal’s 
decision to respect Duch’s due process rights. Due process rights that appear to 
mollycoddle perpetrators often dismay victims of violent crime. Yet, the ECCC’s 
civil party process does not hold itself out to be any ordinary criminal process. It 
has, as I have explained, restorative aspirations: it seeks to place the victim civil 
party at the center of the justice process, as an equal participant with the 
Prosecution and Defense, in the hopes that this re-orientation will restore his/her 
dignity. It is therefore reasonable for Bou to complain that he does not enjoy the 
defendants’ resources, protection or medical care: “My lawyer says I am same as 
the Prosecution and Defence. But all the money goes to the defendants. Th e vic-
tims got nothing from that money, but the defendants got a lot of things. Th ey 
live in their comfortable cells with great doctors. Th ey live comfortable lives. It is 
like they are being given a salary and accommodation. It is unfair to me. I am the 
one working for the Tribunal, helping them. Th e defendants got US$3 million 
for the trial, but we get nothing. Not even an apology.” 150 
 Like Bou Meng, the Khmer Rouge spared Van Naath who was beaten, tor-
tured and almost starved to death at S-21, when they discovered his talent for 
painting. Van was forced to paint portraits of Duch and Pol Pot until the regime 
was toppled in 1979. He too lost family – including two sons – to the regime. Ye, 
unlike Bou, Van does not want to be a civil party. He is content if the Prosecution 
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 151)  Author’s interview with survivor Van Naath, 8 December 2008. 
 152)  Ibid. 
 153)  Author’s interview with survivor Van Naath, 8 December 2008 (“What you think is wrong. 
From 1979, we all started our lives once again from scratch. Th e government gave me one house (in 
Phnom Penh), just like any other. I simply worked hard to survive. I went to work for the Ministry 
of Defence, serving this state for almost 20 years. After the army service, I came back to live and do 
small business like any other Cambodians, with no government’s support because the government 
is poor. I did not even collect my pension. I worked day and night; I dared not sleep too much 
because if you are not afraid of being tired, you are afraid of being poor. I am not very wealthy. I am 
not in any debt and I can provide food for my children.”) 
calls on him to be a witness. “My reason for choosing not to be civil party mem-
ber is a matter of my personal choice,” Van told me.  I believe the people working 
for the Khmer Rouge Tribunal are fully competent people. I do not want to be a 
civil party, but I will accept the court’s (subpoena) whenever they want me to 
appear in court and tell the truth about S-21.” 151 
 Upon speaking to Van further, I discovered that his reluctance to be a civil 
party is not based so much on his blind faith in the Prosecution as it is on a belief 
that the civil party process may not do justice to his suff ering. While other vic-
tims perceive the title ‘civil party’ to be a talisman of purported authority, to Van, 
it symbolises opportunism, a means to obtain fi nancial reparations for personal 
benefi t. In his view, Van does not want to be associated with victims who wish to 
profi t from their suff ering: “I often hear discussions about the Tribunal.  Many 
times, people seem to want to make use of the Tribunal for themselves. If they are given 
some forms of fi nancial reparations, they are willing to be in the party. If no repara-
tion, they said that would be a waste of their time. Th is is contrary to what I think. 
I have been working hard for the past 30 years so that fi rstly, I can help prevent 
this unfortunate thing to happen again, secondly, the subsequent generations will 
be able to understand how much evil the elder ones had gone through. Lastly, it 
is for the dead so that they did not die in vain.  No matter what they give me in 
reparation, they cannot pay back what I have lost. Th ey can never pay me enough. As 
for me, this is not the case. If they ever are going to give us reparations, we all can 
continue to survive because we live, but how about those who have already passed 
away? Do they (civil parties) consider the dead? ” 152 [Emphasis added]. 
 I asked Van if his disdain for the status and title of ‘civil party’ arises from the 
fact that he is a wealthy painter and does not need the individual fi nancial repara-
tions that Bou, who is also a painter, but not as widely known or acclaimed as 
Van, seeks. Laughing at the bluntness of the question, Van told me that this is not 
true. He recounts how hard his life has been and how he has struggled. Besides, 
for Van, there is no monetary measure that can be put on the loved ones whom 
he lost and to do so would be unthinkable. According to Van, he will speak as a 
witness for his “conscience.” 153 
 Van does not want S-21 to be remade into a museum, as Chum and leading 
Cambodian NGOs do. He prefers that the collective reparations that the court 
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 154)  Ibid. 
orders at the end of the day take the form of a hospital for victims, which he feels 
will have far greater utility for Cambodians than a memorial: “A genocide 
museum? Th at is pointless. It is of no benefi t to the victims. I want the victims to 
receive some forms of benefi ts, I am not asking that for myself, no. It is for the 
elderly, the lonely ones who have lost their spouses, children and relatives during 
the regime. Th ey are suff ering because whenever they fall sick, they have no 
money to go to hospital. I want all of them to have access to healthcare just like 
any other Cambodians. If there is anyone at all who is willing to give us collective 
reparation, I want them to provide for us as a community. As in, for example, 
I want them to give us a hospital, an absolutely independent hospital, without the 
aid from the government. It shall be open for the victims like the lonely elderly, 
the poor and miserable, absolutely free of charge. It shall be a general hospital. 
If this is ever done, I will feel that justice is served and I shall be pleased.” 154 
 What emerges from my conversations with Van, Chum and Bou is not that 
one is more righteous than the other, but that they simply are diff erent people 
with diff erent identities and desires, regardless of the similarity of the site and 
severity of the crimes they suff ered at the hands of the Khmer Rouge. When the 
victim is promised a place at the centre of the justice equation, vindication 
becomes important, and similar off ences may be resolved in an entirely distinct 
manner. Victims such as Chum may be satisfi ed with a symbolic demonstration 
of the Tribunal’s willingness to acknowledge the victim’s trauma whereas another 
victim, like Bou might require a far more signifi cant, monetarily measured recog-
nition of his pain in order to distinguish it from the aggregation that trial pro-
cesses, including the civil party process facilitate. Still others, like Van may wish 
for communal goals to be achieved though his approach, which may be attractive 
to the Tribunal, but could alienate victims’ individual needs. Victims often feel 
that they need or want to express a range of desires and emotions in court or to 
intermediaries, simply for their own benefi t. 
 If the ECCC and its affi  liates neglect these varied desires, there is a risk of disil-
lusionment among civil parties. A signifi cant consequence of according a purely 
expressive role to victims that subordinates them to a calculus of greatest overall 
societal good, as the ECCC’s procedure and practice has begun to do, is that if 
victims perceive their role as something more than just an expressive one, frustra-
tion is likely to ensure. 
 4.4. Victims – ‘Th ey can be diffi  cult’ 
 As we have seen, tensions arise when victims are conferred (or denied) legal stand-
ing as civil parties. Cambodian victim civil parties do not kow-tow and gratefully 
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 155)  “Th ank you, thank you, sir” in Khmer. 
 156)  Author’s interview with David Boyle, 28 Nov 08. 
 157)  Author’s interview with Craig Etcheson, 28 Nov 08. 
 158)  Author’s interview with Craig Etcheson, 28 Nov 08. 
whisper “ au kun, au kun borng ” , 155 the familiar greeting ECCC affi  liates may be 
used to hearing and acknowledging with a nod. Victims may shout, scream or 
express a range of emotions that are frowned upon in court. As ECCC investiga-
tor David Boyle told me: “In my experience, a problem arises when you think 
that because you are trying to help and include them that they should line up and 
nod politely to you. Often they do not. Th ey shout. Th ey express their individu-
alism. Th ey have deep feelings that are beyond my comprehension.” 156 
 Another ECCC investigator and scholar, Craig Etcheson, added that victims 
can be a “diffi  cult” bunch: “During investigations, after a while the bones become 
beautiful and the ghosts become your friends, but the victim survivors – they can 
be diffi  cult. Th is is because they are deeply emotional beings. We should not dis-
count that. Many still suff er from deep psychological scarring and it can be trans-
mitted across generations.” 157 
 When I asked Etcheson what the role of civil parties at the tribunal was, and if 
it should be a prominent one, he replied: “Victim civil parties are not and should 
not be the driving force of the court – they are at best an auxiliary force. What is 
their role? Well, someone has to tell the story, but it is unresolved if this is best left 
to [Prosecution] witnesses rather than civil parties.” 158 
 When victims learn that the ECCC’s s gift of legal standing comes with strings 
attached, i.e. that victims cannot be the Tribunal’s “driving force”, but must take 
a back seat to the Prosecution and defer to the Defendant’s rights, the victims 
I spoke to were unimpressed. I observed that once Cambodian victims are prom-
ised or conferred legal standing and made parties to the proceedings, they carve 
out their own path. Apart from the fact that desires for vindication can diff er 
dramatically between victims who have suff ered similar crimes – as we have seen 
in the case of Chum Mey, Bou Meng and Van Naath – there are obvious distinc-
tions between Cambodian victims who wish to participate in the ECCC’s pro-
ceedings. First, there is an obvious gender distribution: about 58% of potential 
civil parties are female victims. Second, their ages diff er a great deal as well. 
 Under the rules, a victim who lived through the Khmer Rouge period and has 
suff ered direct physical harm (a “1 st Generation Victim”) has an equal right to be 
recognized as a civil party as victim who suff ers psychological harm as a result of 
the loss of kin at the hands of the Khmer Rouge, even if she did not sustain any 
other direct harm (a “2 nd Generation Victim”). Th is has resulted in a signifi cant 
variation between the ages of civil parties (see  Figure 1 below), which brings with 
it attendant diff erences in attitudes, memories, perceptions and desires for vindi-
cation amongst civil parties and victim participants. 
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 4.5. Th erapeutic Legalism 
 As we have seen, even when we compare victims of the same gender and similar 
age who have shared experiences, it becomes clear that they can have very diff er-
ent perceptions that confound and resist any attempt by to reduce and universa-
lise civil parties. By clothing civil parties with a uniform legal identity because of 
their victimization, the ECCC’s legal process, just as it lowers the perpetrator’s 
identity, has also begun to ignore or confl ate the victims’ varied personal identi-
ties, memories, and desires for vindication. Paradoxically, the very identity that 
victims coveted when applying to become civil parties has prompted some to 
claim that they have been degraded by it. 
 An examination of the relationship between these victim civil parties and the 
Tribunal reveals that the victims’ narratives are being given short shrift. Th e 
expression of their individual stories – a foremost reason for including victims in 
the fi rst place – is being constrained by the ECCC’s judicial fervour to establish a 
legally authoritative account of ‘what happened.’ Even before trials have begun, 
legal considerations premised on notions of collective justice have begun to bypass 
the individuality of victims, including their needs as traumatized persons. 
Confl icts have also emerged between victims and the legal stage they have entered 
as civil parties; between the individual needs of victims and the requirements of 
collective justice. 
 Civil parties rarely speak with one voice and are likely to have diff erent identi-
ties, perspectives and desires for vindication. Yet, civil parties’ individuality of 
experience has been diminished by the aggregation of victim identities by the Tri-
bunal and the prospect of common legal representation and collective  reparations. 
 Figure 1.  Age structure of Cambodian victim participants. 
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 159)   Judith Butler , Psychic Life of Power, p. 28. 
 160)   Judith Lewis Herman , Th e Mental Health of Crime Victims: Impact of Legal Intervention, 
16Journal of Traumatic Stress 159, 165 (2003). 
 161)   Diane Marie Aman , Message As Medium in Sierra Leone, 7 International Law Students’ 
Association Journal of International & Comparative Law 237, 238 (2001). 
Further, civil parties do not have equal access to the Tribunal’s process, as some 
remain passive observers, while others have become subversive speakers, whose 
rights have been curtailed. 
 Th e paradox of victim-centrism in the context of the ECCC’s civil party pro-
cess is that the process is set up to externalise conceptions of justice even as it 
promises to internalise them for victims’ benefi t. From what I have observed, the 
promise of ‘empowerment’ through participation is a rhetorical device. Th e only 
way for civil parties to be recognised is by “submitting to a world of others that is 
fundamentally not one’s own” and results in a “primary alienation in sociality.” 159 
Yet, victims’ submission to the ECCC’s regulatory power, while the source of the 
civil party’s legal status and existence in the public domain, also spells the end of 
their individual expression. 
 Th ere is not always room for historical narratives, personal identity and social 
memory within the formalism of the legal process. Chim Math and Norng Chan 
Pal need social acknowledgement and support; the Tribunal requires them to 
endure a public challenge to their credibility. Bou Meng, Sum Rithy and Ly 
Monysak need to establish a sense of power and control over their lives; the 
Tribunal requires them to submit to a complex set of rules and procedures that 
they may not understand, and over which they have no control. Th eary Seng 
needs an opportunity to tell her story in her own way, in a setting of her choice 
and in a manner she sees fi t; the Tribunal requires her to submit to and speak 
through a lawyer tasked with constructing a factually coherent narrative. 160 
Th erefore, one cannot conclude that participation as a civil party in the ECCC’s 
proceedings is  ipso facto benefi cial to victims of the Khmer Rouge. 
 5. Recommendations 
 5.1. Modesty of Ambition 
 Diane Marie Aman reminds us that for the law to have expressive value, the “mes-
sage understood, rather than the message intended, is critical.” 161 Th e message 
that many of the civil party victims I spoke with understand, is that theirs is a 
token role. Th e ECCC, which began with grand ambitions that promised to 
place the civil party at the top of Arnstein’s ladder, high above victim-witnesses or 
complainants, seems to have incrementally forced them to occupy a lower rung: 
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it is tantamount to therapy (see  Table 1 .).  Peter Macguire states that the civil party 
process, for all its promise, lacks any empirical basis: “I would put [the process] 
this under the category of therapeutic legalism. Th is is an invention of the 1990s, 
where people freighted the trials with all this baggage.” 162 
 I do not propose the usual palliative that is traditionally prescribed as a comple-
ment or substitute to ailing internationalized trials, i.e., the truth and reconcilia-
tion commission (TRC). As  Rosalind Shaw notes in her ethnographic study of the 
Sierra Leone TRC, these commissions are often freighted with the same baggage 
that weighs heavily upon the ECCC – i.e., “to transform a population that pre-
ferred to heal through forgetting into truth-telling subjects who would, after ade-
quate sensitization, recognize their “need” to talk about the violence.” 163 Legal and 
formal processes often buckle under the strain of supporting therapeutic or restor-
ative goals. Th e ECCC should abide by its foundational goal of delivering account-
ability under the law. As a parallel process, it should be more receptive to strategies 
that commemorate victims in the non-legal arena using pre-existing traditions 
that are communicated in a language that resonates amongst victims. 164 
 5.2. Towards a New Victimology at the ECCC 
 In view of the cognitive dissonance between the ECCC’s rhetoric and the reality, 
it is wise to heed  Hannah Arendt ’s call that a war crimes tribunal like the ECCC 
should never promise more than it can deliver. 165 Th is dissonance is more than 
just conceptually unsatisfying: it may also impair the greater eff ort to address the 
causes and eff ects of mass atrocity. Even if individual Tribunal affi  liates recognize 
that prosecution is no panacea, the aggregate exaggerated claims supporting inter-
national tribunals may relieve pressure on Cambodian and International power 
brokers to supplement prosecution with other tools, diverting precious attention 
and resources from mechanisms that may more eff ectively meet some of the ratio-
nales discussed above. 
 If existing means of prosecution can adequately spur individual catharsis 
and national reconciliation, why sponsor additional communal reconstructive 
 measures? 166 Given the diffi  culty of mobilizing and coordinating political will to 
 162)   Seth Mydans , In Khmer Rouge Trials, Victims Will  Not Stand Idly By, International Herald 
Tribune, June 17, 2008. 
 163)   Rosalind Shaw , Rethinking Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: Lessons from Sierra Leone. 
U.S. Institute of Peace. February 2005, Special Report 130. p. 4. 
 164)  See  Mark A. Drumbl , Toward a Criminology of International Crime , 19 Ohio State Journal of 
Dispute Resolution. 263, 276 (2003). 
 165)  See generally  Hannah Arendt , Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil 
(1963). 
 166)  Indeed, advocates have been so successful at focusing political energy on prosecution that the 
international community’s attention may have been unduly distracted not only from other means 
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achieve international goals beyond narrow national and international  self-interest, 
even this initial eff ect may disproportionately deter support for supplemental 
mechanisms outside the legal arena that more adequately meet the objectives of 
victim-centrism. 167 
 Of course, this is not to suggest that we should do away with the ECCC. 
Tribunals serve a purpose: to try perpetrators and, if their guilt meets the requisite 
standard of legal proof based on the admissible evidence adduced, to convict and 
punish them accordingly. While this purpose is limited, it is dependable and less 
likely to result in unfulfi lled promises. However, tribunals and other  legal justice 
mechanisms may not be ideal platforms for Cambodian victims to recount their 
stories and regain their dignity, let alone for eff ecting peace and national 
reconciliation. 168 
 5.3. Th e Non-Legal Arena 
 5.3.1. Art 
 Victims may benefi t a great deal from the arts. “Artistic response to genocide”, as 
 Jean-Pierre Karegeye reminds us, “is the eff ort to create a space between possibility 
and impossibility, to fi nd speech for the unspeakable, an attempt to represent a 
‘non-object.’ An artist who tries to represent genocide becomes  ipso facto a wit-
ness.” 169 Artists in Cambodia have been engaged in precisely this work for more 
than a decade, when the Tribunal was just a theoretical construct and the promise 
of legal justice was an abstraction. For instance, art historian Ly Daravuth and the 
late artist Ingrid Muan established the Reyum Institute of Arts and Culture in 
1998, which has among other things, developed exhibitions and programs for 
Cambodians that “off er images and texts” aimed at opening a “modest public 
forum in which those who wish to participate can look, think, discuss, and 
of accountability, but also from eff orts to confront the root causes of humanitarian violations. 
Affi  liates may well have created an analogue to Nuremberg without a corresponding analogue to the 
Marshall Plan. See  Mark A. Drumbl , Punishment, Post genocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in 
Rwanda, 75 New York University Law Review. 1221, 1303 (2000). 
 167)   Jose Alvarez , Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadic Judgment, 96 Michigan Law Review. 2031, 
2104 (1998)(“Attempts to make international criminal tribunals carry as much freight as some of 
their advocates recommend …may endanger alternative processes and possibly undermine compet-
ing goals for the international community…”) 
 168)  Critics have suggested that the international criminal justice project is “a religious exercise of 
hope” that “just feels right” whose purpose is a “soothing strategy” so that the international com-
munity can “measure the immeasurable.”:  Tallgren , at 561, 593; see also  Alvarez , at 460-61 (arguing 
that the ICTR represents the pursuit of an international political and liberal- legalist agenda less 
helpful to Rwanda than joint initiatives within Rwanda itself would have been). 
 169)  “Arts in the One World: A Consideration of Genocide.” Conference co-sponsored by Th eater 
Without Borders, Co-Existence International Brandeis University, CalArts, Los Angeles, CA, 27-29 
January 2006. Conference notes online at:  http://www.brandeis.edu/coexistence/linked%
20documents/Genocide_Conference_Notes.pdf 
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 create”. By doing so, they “feel that we contribute towards coexistence – if not 
reconciliation – in Cambodia,” 170 and Reyum has strived to live up to its promise 
at every opportunity. 171 
 In contrast to the law, which understands ‘facts’ restrictively and is bound by 
formalism, art – be it paintings, story-telling, dance or song – operates at the 
experiential, sensory level and creates a space for victims to confront unbound 
events and emotions that remain unarticulated. Th is is not to say that there is no 
structure to art.  Cynthia Cohen describes the aesthetic of artistic transactions, a 
vital prerequisite that creates a space of trust and openness for survivors to re-
member brutal pasts, as follows: “A framed picture, for instance, and a theatrical 
event with a clear beginning and end, each provides boundaries within which 
viewers can focus intensively…Th e bounded quality and formal structures of 
artworks and ritual can provide support for survivors of violence to confront and 
work through painful history that might otherwise be too overwhelming to 
face.” 172 
 Put simply, whereas the strictures of legal stage can be ‘tiny’, the structure of 
artistic space permits it to grow ‘huge’. An artistic space, be it an empty canvas, 
an as yet unoccupied stage or an empty room, provides survivors with the free-
dom to articulate bold and commemorative counter-narratives that emphasise 
victim-centrism in opposition to the dominant discourse of powerlessness and 
degradation. Artists in Cambodia have begun to voice these counter-narratives 
for the benefi t of the larger Cambodian community. 173 At the same time, 
 170)   Ly Daravuth &  Ingrid Muan , Recasting Reconciliation through Culture and the Arts , together 
with the Slifka Program in Inter-Communal Coexistence, Brandeis University, 2003. See:  http://
www.ceri-sciencespo.com/themes/re-imaginingpeace/va/base/Cambodia_1173189188.pdf 
 171)  Reyum contributed towards a worldwide exhibition under the auspices of Th e Legacy Project, 
an organization set up by entrepreneur Cliff ord Chanin to “draw together artists from countries 
that have suff ered mass national traumas or genocides, leaving a great ‘absence’ among the popu-
lace.” Reyum and Ly Daravuth called this the “Th e Legacy of Absence” exhibition. Organized in 
2000, it featured ten Cambodian painters both old and young, who wrestled with the traumatic 
memory of genocide in Cambodia using the visual arts medium.  Sarah Stephens , Th e Legacy of 
Absence: Cambodian Artists Confront the Past. Article online at:  http://www.asianart.com/
exhibitions/legacy/intro.html 
 172)   Cynthia Cohen , Creative Approaches to Reconciliation in  Mari Fitzduff  &  Christopher E. Stout 
(eds.), Th e Psychology of Resolving Global Confl icts: From War to Peace, p. 6 (Westport, 
Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2005)  Also available online at:  http://www.brandeis
.edu/slifka/vrc/Creative%20Approaches.pdf 
 173)  In April 2008, a gallery exhibited works by older and contemporary Cambodian painters in an 
exhibition called “Th e Art of Survival” at the Meta House in Phnom Penh. 28-year old Vandy 
Rattana, whose canvas shows a political chessboard involving Vietnam, the U.S. and Cambodia – a 
fragmented portrait of a tragedy, said, regarding the exhibition, “It gives me a voice to say some-
thing about my history.” Indeed, Meta House director Nico Mesterharm called this exhibition a 
“platform for community dialogue” and expressed hope that it would contribute to the reconcilia-
tion process in Cambodia “Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge Genocide Inspires fi rst of its kind art exhibit.” 
AFP, 6 April 2008. Online at: http://newsgroups.derkeiler.com/pdf/Archive/Soc/soc.culture.
cambodia/2008-04/msg00097.pdf 
1051
1052
1053
1054
1055
1056
1057
1058
1059
1060
1061
1062
1063
1064
1065
1066
1067
1068
1069
1070
1071
1072
0001102591.indd_PG2254   40   8/27/2009   3:30:26 PM
 M. Mohan / International Criminal Law Review 9 (2009) 1–43 41
Cambodian artists engage in expression that may be non-verbal and allows for 
silences, inasmuch as it invites articulation. 
 Th e eff orts by Cambodians to engage with the arts and respond to the genocide 
are too numerous to detail here. It suffi  ces to say that there is great potential and 
interest for artistic expression in Cambodia as a means of restorative justice. 174 Th e 
ECCC’s Victims Unit should consider engaging Cambodian artists and arts orga-
nizations to discover what silences need to be respected; what forms of forgetting 
and remembering are desired and required by the community and what desires 
and hopes victims have for the future, beyond the strictures of the Tribunal itself. 
 5.3.2. Ritual 
 Every year around late September to early October, Cambodians mark fi fteen 
days in their calendars beginning with Kan Ben on the fi rst day and ending with 
Pchum Ben on the fi fteenth day. Sticky rice balls are a central feature of the ritual 
and are prepared in large numbers to be scattered across temple grounds for the 
spirits. Th is annual ceremony is a way for the souls of the dead to be honoured, 
fed, remembered (through local ritual means) and allows the living to assist to 
re-enter the cycle of life and death and ultimately, to reincarnate. Artist and 
Reyum director  Ly Daravuth has called for a special Pchum Ben ceremony and 
there is merit to heeding this call. 
 For  Ly , Pchum Ben has particular signifi cance because it bridges the gap 
between the individual and the collective, a bridge that the ECCC’s civil party 
process has thus far been unable to construct: “For instance, formal elements of 
this ceremony suggest the interaction between the one and the multiple, the indi-
vidual and the collective…Th e individual rice balls…are gathered together to 
form a collective Ben…Th e notion of private and public is also articulated 
through the combination of paying respect to the deceased of one’s own family as 
well as the deceased of the community as a whole.” 175 
 Here, the most poignant aspect of Pchum Ben emerges – in its inclusivity, its 
gathering of souls, of food, of the living who give and share regardless of social 
hierarchies, identities and even sins. Th at Pchum Ben critically includes off erings 
for the  pretta , or the souls of the damned, is a reminder that local communities 
have their own, particular ways of reconciling with the irreconcilable. Cambodians 
 174)  Apart from the visual arts, theatre and dance, documentary fi lms have been made by Cambodians 
in the diaspora such as “New Year Baby” by Socheata Poeuv and “S-21: Th e Khmer Rouge Killing 
Machine” by Rithy Panh, as well as documentaries by foreigners such as Greg Cahill’s “Th e Golden 
Voice” about legendary Khmer pop icon Ros Sereysothea, and John Pirozzi’s documentary “Don’t 
Th ink I’ve Forgotten – Cambodia’s Lost Rock’n’Roll.” Th e examples cited in this Part are only a 
small sample of the eff orts by Cambodians to reinvigorate and kick-start a decimated arts scene. 
 175)   Ly Daravuth , Notes on Pchum Ben – A Working Paper of Recasting Reconciliation through 
Culture and the Arts, p. 2. Online at:  http://www.brandeis.edu/programs/Slifka/vrc/papers/
daravuth/pchum_ben.html 
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silently engage in an annual ritual of forgiving, forgetting, letting go and quite 
literally off ering both food and solace to wandering spirits – the damned, those 
that sinned and those sinned against. Now, with the advent of the Tribunal, which 
has elicited and stirred memories, the time is ripe for what  Ly Daravuth calls a 
“special Pchum Ben.” As  Ly reminds us, many Cambodian victims “can only start 
down the path toward healing, accepting, forgiving and reconciling only after this 
‘initial duty’ has been fulfi lled…Th e impulse of the Pchum Ben is one of rebuild-
ing and re-gathering, rather than dividing, separating, and scattering. Living and 
deeply rooted in Cambodian society, it draws its strength from the religious and 
spiritual strata.” 176 
 Th e ECCC’s internationalized legal justice process may be wary of ritualistic 
practices that are unfamiliar and incommensurable with international legal 
norms. Yet, legal norms often have, as we have seen, little resonance for victims. 
 Rama Mani reminds us that “[i]f ideas and institutions about as fundamental and 
personal a value as justice are imposed from the outside without an internal reso-
nance, they may fl ounder, notwithstanding their assertions of universality.” 177 
Th e law, as a form of power, seeks reverence through subordination and, if it fails 
to deliver, engenders frustration and disenchantment. Rituals – widely respected 
local norms – such as the ‘special Pchum Ben’ on the other hand occupy the 
realm of the sacred. Ritual is a marker of each community’s particular approach 
to life, death, bereavement and memory. It provides a way for communities to 
reconstruct their lives, their kinship networks and their sense of rootedness in the 
aftermath of mass violence. Th e special Pchum Ben could thus play a vital role 
towards achieving victim-centric notions of catharsis. By extolling the devotee as 
expert, in this case the victim, the Pchum Ben allows her to commemorate herself 
just as she commemorates her memory of the loved ones she has lost. Seen in this 
light, it is the antithesis of the judicial ritual. 178 
 6. Conclusion 
 Th e ECCC’s civil party process promises to deliver restorative justice, but clings 
to modes of accountability that set limits upon how the victim’s story is narrated 
 176)  Ibid. 
 177)   Rama Mani , Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War 47, 48 n. 128 
(2002). 
 178)  See, e.g., Cynthia Cohen , Engaging with the Arts to Promote Coexistence in  Antonia Chayes & 
 Martha Minow , (eds.) Imagine Coexistence: Restoring Humanity After Violent Ethnic Confl ict 6. 
(San Francisco, Jossey-Bass: 2003) (“Even when material resources are scarce, people still have their 
songs, stories, cooking styles, children’s games, and perhaps gardens. Th ese resources exist within 
the community and the community’s members themselves are the experts.”) Also available at: 
 http://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/pdfs/publications/Engaging_Arts.pdf 
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and what parts of the story are permissible and how, if at all, it should be expressed. 
Th e victim who wishes to participate in this judicial ritual is required to provide an 
account that “is completed only on the occasion when it is eff ectively exported and 
expropriated from the domain of what is (her) own.” 179 Paradoxically, the victims 
I spoke to who were asked to come forward with promises of signifi cant participa-
tion as a means of assuaging their suff ering now fi nd themselves dispossessed. 
 Going forward, victims’ perceptions of participation in the ECCC’s proceed-
ings require specifi c attention and research. Judges and other Tribunal affi  liates 
need, at the very least, to be trained not to make the process of participation as a 
civil party an unnecessarily painful or exclusive process that pays lip-service to 
victims. Victims must be put in a position to make an informed decision about 
the modality of their participation. Th ey should, for example, be made aware 
from the very outset that they may not be able to express the full range of their 
emotions in court. I accept that victim-centrism in its purest sense responds to a 
genuine desire amongst many victims to ‘have their say’ in an authoritative legal 
arena. However, the legal arena is only willing and able to go so far. If the ECCC 
is indeed serious about pursuing the goals of restorative justice, it must be pre-
pared to explore the non-legal arena, however alien it may seem to lawyers. 
 Th e authority that the law enjoys makes it diffi  cult for the ECCC to accept this 
conclusion. Yet, in view of the fact that the ECCC’s civil party process may harm 
and degrade victims even as it seeks to include them, it is imperative that ECCC’s 
affi  liates be wary of the goals they heap upon the legal process that is meant to 
provide accountability according to law. For a start, the ECCC’s Victim Unit 
should engage art and ritual to fi nd ways for victims to grapple with the non-
narrativizable. At the conclusion of the trials, the ECCC’s Trial Chamber should 
consider ordering collective and moral reparations that contribute and support 
these activities. Without entertaining a new, inter-disciplinary victimology that 
recognizes that restorative justice can be meted outside the courtroom at a spiritual 
ceremony, on a dramatic stage or through the arts, the civil party process may be 
nothing more than, in the erudite words of one Cambodian victim, a “circus.” 180 
 179)   Judith Butler, Giving An Account of Oneself 36-37 (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2005); see also  Martha Minow , Stories in Law in  Rickie Solinger, Madeline Fox &  Kayhan Irani , 
(eds.) Telling Stories to Change the World 249-263 (New York, Routledge: 2008).  Minow , drawing 
from  Hannah Arendt , discusses the value of storytelling in court settings and the need for stories to 
off -set the predominance of rationalist social science techniques that treat genocides as capable of 
being explained. She also emphasizes, via  Arendt again, the partial, incomplete nature of stories in 
the face of horror, something akin to my use of  Butler’s analysis of subjection, power and 
narrative. 
 180)  Author’s interview with Ly Monysak, 6 December 2008:  “I would like the court to have the 
real will to fi nd justice. Th e court is not supposed to be a circus. But sometimes I feel that this court 
is performing a circus. I don’t really trust the court.” 
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